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Abstract 
Liberal democratic countries in the West employ a variety of mechanisms to encourage 
authoritarian regimes to embrace liberal democratic governance, arguing that political 
freedoms best ensure domestic tranquility and prosperity. In recent time especially, 
however, some new democracies have struggled economically whereas some 
authoritarian regimes have seen sustained and impressive rates of economic growth and 
higher development. This paper rejects the notion that economic performance is a 
function of regime type, with democracies outperforming autocracies. It argues instead 
that a country’s economic development is result the of executive constraints, rule of law, 
durability and economic freedom – not regime type per se. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Most policy proposals emanating from international organizations stress democratic 
governance as a way to achieving high human development. This may not be the best 
course of action. The fall of the Berlin Wall marking the end of the Cold War also led to 
a triumph of democracy. Many countries of Eastern Europe were moving away from 
communism, Sub-Saharan Africa was experiencing democratic transitions and the former 
Soviet Union Eastern European countries seemed to be moving in the same direction. The 
number of electoral democracies quickly rose from 35 in 1970 to 110 in 2014 
(Fukuyama, 2015). The optimism was premature. Many of the countries that transitioned 
did become democracies, but did not perform well in providing protections and civil 
liberties they were expected to. Likewise, the multiparty elections that have spread across 
the continents have produced popular leaders who do not mind circumventing legislatures 
and ruling by decree. The problem was that many countries that democratized did not 
have prior experience with democratic values and practices, or in certain cases, liberty 
(Zakaria, 997). Instead of liberal democracies, countries (especially in Africa) 
transitioned into neopatrimonial ones. Transitional democracies1 that were highly 
heterogeneous proved unstable and warlike2 (Newman et al., 2004). Even in the case of 
Latin America, where democracy was well entrenched, countries did not display an 
increased ability to deliver education, infrastructure, and efficient welfare policies. As 
well, the rise of the Asian Tigers countries with remarkable improvements in both 
economic and human development was confounding. For instance, Singapore became a 
highly modernized country with a well-educated population.  
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 Nonetheless, just as the impressive economic performance of China or Singapore 
should not be viewed as absolute proof that authoritarianism creates better conditions for 
economic growth, bad economic performance of certain democratic countries should not 
be taken as a proof that democracy is economically inferior. Indeed, the central claim I 
advance here – and buttress empirically – is that regime types are not a good indicator of 
a state’s economic development, as measured by the HDI index and GDP per capita. 
Regime types do not ensure specific developmental outcomes; while certain authoritarian 
regimes perform remarkably well, being an authoritarian regime does not guarantee the 
same success. I claim that rule of law – as measured by perceptions of the extent to which 
individuals have confidence in the rule of law and abide by it– is a far better predictor of 
a state’s development. Also, I claim that constraints on Executive power – measured by 
the Polity IV dataset– are a far better predictor of a state’s development as well. Finally, I 
argue that economic freedoms and regime durability facilitate economic development as 
well.   
In so doing, I structure the thesis thus: first, I engage with the conceptualization of 
regime types, democracies, and non-democracies. Second, I examine the development 
process in terms of the modernization theory. Thirdly, I examine the theoretical 
relationship between regime types and development.  Fourth I present the empirical data, 
models and results. Fifth, I look at potential directions for the study in the future.  
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2 Concepts and Definitions 
 
 
2.1  Conceptualization 
Before starting an overview of different types of political regimes, it is important to 
establish what is specifically meant by the term regime. The present study will follow 
Schmitter and Lynn’s definition of political regimes; on their account a political regime is 
“an ensemble of patterns that determines the methods of access to the principal public 
offices; the characteristics of the actors admitted to or excluded from such access; the 
strategies that actors may use to gain access; and the rules that are followed in the making 
of publicly binding decisions” (Schmitter et al., 1991, p. 4). 
There is a diversity of patterns even among theoretically similar political regimes. 
Yet, for comparative purposes, differences tend to be minimized and political regimes are 
bundled dichotomously into democratic and non-democratic ones. While the term 
democracy encompasses different understandings of democracies, the term tends to 
display a smaller variance than the term non-democracy. For example, difference in the 
procedures and the rules shaping the political outcomes can be said to be starker between 
a totalitarian regime and a monarchy than between a liberal democracy and electoral 
democracy.3 Studies examining political regimes as important factors influencing socio-
political and economic outcomes are abundant. The literature examines the relationship 
between political regimes and a number of variables: regime and economic development 
(Antic, 2004; Prezworski, 2000), regime transitions (Lipset, 1960; Kapstein and 
Converse, 2008; Marshall and Cole 2009; Hungtinton 1991), economic decline (Ulfelder 
and Lustik, 2007), elections (Schedler, 2010; Lindberg, 2009, Bunce and Wolchik 2010), 
resilience (Nathan, 2003), and government spending (Desai et al, 2010; Ghandi, 2007). 
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Yet, while the literature on political regimes and economic development is plentiful, 
whether political regime are good determinants of performance, and whether one is better 
than others, remains contested (Robinson, 2006; Cheibub et al., 2010; Przeworski et al., 
2000; Acemoglu et al., 2008; Jackman, 1973; Arat, 1988; Diamond, 1992). Before 
engaging with these questions, an overview of democratic and non-democratic regimes 
will be presented in the following paragraphs.  
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2.2   Democracies 
  
“The history of the idea of democracy is curious; the history of 
democracies is puzzling.” – David Held, Models of Democracy 
The concept of democracy is interesting. The fact that the city states of ancient Greece 
saw the rise of norms of citizen equality, liberty, and political freedom as early as 8th 
century is remarkable; this is especially remarkable in view of the fact that most others 
societies evolved under pyramidal power-structures. Yet, after this period, democracy 
was a largely distrusted and feared form of political organization until the early 19th 
century. It was only later that the connotation of democracy changed and it started to be 
perceived as the optimal form of governance.   
Considering the paragraph above, it is not surprising to find that the meaning of 
democracy remains a point of contestation in academia. While there is a general 
consensus on what democratic governance is at the basic level, how extensive and 
detailed the definition should be remains a point of contention. Consequently, one 
approach rests on a minimalistic definition of democracy. Rather than focusing on 
outcomes or policies that can be dubbed democratic, this criterion strives to capture 
democratic procedures (Collier et al., 1997). It is essentially a reduced notion of 
democracy because it refrains from specifying the benchmark for accountability, 
responsibility, civil liberties or economic and social aspects; it is often seen as a 
functional convenience meant to ease empirical work, comparative approaches, and 
accommodate different varieties of democracies. Consequently, the minimalist 
conception is very beneficial due to its compactness and flexibility. Nonetheless, the 
minimalist conceptualization needs to be applied selectively as it does not necessarily 
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capture the quality or depth of liberal democracy.4 The most renowned minimalist 
conceptualization was offered by Schumpeter (1942). It defines democracies as systems 
within which the executive offices are allotted through competitive elections. It could be 
said that most of the literature following this approach tends to equate democracy with 
electoral competition. Przeworski (2000, p.16) embraces this approach, establishing 
democracies as a “system in which parties lose elections”. Likewise, Karl Popper 
proposed that democracy is a political system within which governments can be replaced 
without bloodshed (Dahrendorf, 2003). Yet, despite the economical nature of the 
approach, minimalist definitions are not self-contained nor do they exist in a vacuum. In 
other words, the aforementioned statements imply several things; there are people who 
are able to vote; there are candidates to choose from; transfer of power is peaceful and is 
the only accepted way for government succession (Siaroff, 2005, pp. 67-73).  
Yet others, fearing that equating democracies with elections obscures all the 
norms and values democracies are supposed to offer, choose to create a wider set of 
qualifications. They are critical of minimalist approaches as these are prone to 
committing the “fallacy of electoralism,” that is, privileging elections over other 
important dimensions of democracy (Karl, 1990). Specifically, as Schmitter and Karl 
note, the fallacy of equating democracies with electoralism lies in the assumption that the 
mere act of holding of elections will lead to peaceful and legitimate outcomes.  It is due 
to potential problems of confusion arising from the brief nature of minimalist definitions 
that they require to be periodically elaborated on or “precised” (Collier and Levitsky, 
1997). Rather, this conceptual approach favors the use of extended procedural definitions 
that are capable of capturing the intricate nature of democracies. Consequently, Schmitter 
and Karl argue that Dahl’s criterion offers the most comprehensive conceptualization; 
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they add two points of clarification to the set. Accordingly, democracy is defined as a 
polity such that the following conditions obtain: (1) governmental officials are 
constitutionally chosen;5 (2) elections are free and fair;6 (3) there is inclusive suffrage;7 
(4) it is legally possible for citizens to go into politics; (5) freedom of speech is 
constitutionally protected as are (6) freedom of information, (7) freedom to form labor, 
political, and other associations, and (8) freedom from interruption for popularly elected 
officials; finally (9) the polity is self-governing or sovereign.8 Dahl’s approach, thus, 
offers one of the most coherent and well defined conceptualizations.  
At the end, what needs to be understood is that no country perfectly embodies the 
spirit of democracy or its norms; not even advanced democracies. That is, there are 
constitutional constraints and societal norms that democratic politics is subject to and 
affected by; electoral institutions are inevitably discriminatory to some individuals;9 
access is not perfectly equal nor costless; scope and authority of elective offices is 
limited; and actors do not abstain from maneuvering and bending rules to achieve their 
goals (Schedler, 2009). However, these shortfalls in institutionalized democracies tend to 
be minimized.  
As a consequence of the aforementioned, this work relies on Dahl’s definition. 
Particularly, this study employs the Polity IV dataset, for empirical purposes, which 
measures the authority patterns among regimes; the idea of authority patterns is 
interchangeable with state-organizations and only formal classes of polities are 
considered in the data (see Chapter 5). While the dataset is rigorous and acknowledges 
the importance of civil liberties for democratic governance, it does not “include coded 
data on civil liberties” (Jaggers & Marshall, 2009, p.4). Thereby, acting as a midpoint 
between minimalist definitions and expanded procedural definitions, the dataset offers a 
 
 
8 
wider array of policy questions that can be tested. Lastly, it offers a sectional harmony to 
both the theoretical and empirical analysis. 
 
2.2.1 Types of Democracies 
 
While academics have approached the task of classifying democracies in various ways, 
this section will provide only a finite overview of some. According to one extensive 
study that surveyed over 50 academic articles, there are more than 550 subtypes of 
democracy (Collier and Levitsky, 1996). What mostly contributes to this problem is 
concept gerrymandering. In other words, it often happens that a single anomalous case 
results in the creation of a completely new subtype, regardless of whether such an action 
is justifiable. It would be nothing less than a Sisyphean task to try to capture all of these 
differences and reconcile them. Instead, the basic aim here will be to develop adequate 
understanding of the main classifications of democracy, as these will be referred to in 
Chapters 4 of the study. That is, they will be of great benefit when evaluating 
relationships between political regimes, economic freedom, and human development later 
on. Lastly, it is important to note that further paragraphs only refer to non-failed states 
that have a government which heads a sovereign state.   
Along the same lines lies the divide between electoral and liberal democracies. It 
is often a neglected fact that liberty and democracy are not interchangeable or 
interdependent (Schmitter & Karl, 1995). There are many illiberal democracies that are 
rife with human rights abuses and civil conflict (Zakaria, 1995). Nonetheless, the 
separation of liberty and democracy is maintained under the idea of electoral democracy. 
In particular, this democratic type is mainly centered around the idea of elections. If a 
country (1) is ruled by a civilian government, (2) fills its political offices through 
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competitive and multiparty elections, (3) has institutionalized elections, and (4) offers 
universal suffrage, then it can be labeled as an electoral democracy.  Due to its distinction 
between different ideas, electoral democracy is widely adopted (Huntington, 1995; 
Lipset, 1981; Linz, 978; Pennock, 1979). On the other hand, while liberal democracy is 
electoral democracy, the reverse is not true. If taking the electoral approach, Turkey, 
India, Russia, and Sri Lanka would be democracies. If one switches to using the liberal 
democracy concept, maybe only India would pass. Hence, liberal democracy entails 
attributes of electoral democracy and much more. It also requires extensive civil and 
political liberties from freedom of speech, assembly, and religion to the rule of law 
(Plattner, 1999). Lastly, it rests on the idea of the separation of powers so that executive 
powers are constrained and the government accountable to the people.  
The second typology, offered by Jose Antonio Cheibub (2007), divides 
democracies according to the system of government into presidential, parliamentary and 
mixed. The central feature of parliamentary democracies is that the government is 
dependent on the legislature and, when the conditions arise, the government can be 
removed from the office by a legislative majority either through a vote of no confidence, 
a constructive vote of no confidence, or rejecting a vote of confidence initiated by the 
government.10 Consequently, either a new government is formed, according to the 
distribution of seats that exists at that time, or new elections are held with the expectation 
that a new distribution of legislative seats will itself give rise to a new government 
(Cheibub, 2007). On the other hand, in presidential systems, the legislature and the 
executive are independent of each other as the president is elected for a fixed term and 
cannot be removed by the legislature11 even if acting in the interest different from that of 
the legislative majority (Cheibub, 2007). 
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While chapter 4 will study the differences between presidential and parliamentary 
forms of government, one thing is important to emphasize. Societies are not homogenous, 
and arguably even less so due to the onset of globalization and increased migration. Thus, 
which democratic form will achieve the best performance might be dependent on the 
environment and conditions it takes root in. This is an approach taken by Jose Antonio 
Cheibub, who looks at whether intrinsic (endogenous) features can explain the difference 
in outcomes of parliamentary and presidential democracies. Not surprisingly, Cheibub 
(2007) finds that it is not due to their intrinsic features that one form tends to deliver 
better economic results and political stability12 in certain settings but not others.   
 
2.3 Non-democratic regime types: Conceptualization 
In the past two centuries, the global political and economic conditions have changed 
dramatically and inconsistently. Namely, while many countries experienced changes in 
their growth rates as well as changes to their political structures, these changes have not 
been uniform nor sustained equally. In other words, while economic growth rates have 
increased for most of the countries, they were not permanent and faced large volatilities. 
Similarly, while many countries democratized in different waves, the levels and depths to 
which countries embraced democratic institutions and values differed. The former pure 
non-democratic regimes experienced changes of their own, often adopting certain 
structures traditionally associated with a different regime type, becoming a whole new 
occurrence on their own (i.e. hybrid regimes). Consequently, the academic field faced 
new dilemmas in how to properly qualify, define and measure these hybrid regimes. As 
scholars started confronting this challenge, a variety of concepts were developed that, 
unintentionally, created confusion due to the overlap and inconsistency (Gilbert et al., 
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2011). Specifically, empirical works became more difficult to compare, as a clear 
standardized conceptualization was lacking, overwhelming attempts at establishing clear 
correlations between variables.  
In an effort to overcome this barrier, this work will first identify the typologies 
most widely used in the literature, and will attempt to outline and reconcile the different 
terms used to denote the same regime types and establish sister terms.  
 
2.3.1 Typology I 
Due to the dichotomous nature of democracy and autocracy that did not allow for 
variations among the two regime types, one approach was to create a new regime 
classification. Since these regimes were viewed as gravitating towards democracy, it was 
suggested that these countries be grouped under the term defective democracy. However, 
this leads to the creation of a number of concepts capturing the same phenomenon: 
exclusive democracy, illiberal democracy, delegative democracy, tutelary democracy, 
and clientelist democracy (O’Donnell, 1994; Zakaria, 2007; Collier and Levinsky, 1997; 
Wolfgang, 2004). But, this approach proved problematic as the term democracy was 
applied to countries not upholding even the most minimal norms and weakened the 
perceived extent to which a country is authoritarian (Schedler, 2009). Hence, there came 
about a shift from emphasizing the democratic quality of some of the hybrid regimes 
towards emphasizing their authoritarian governance. 
 
2.3.2 Typology II 
A more viable approach does not treat regimes that do not fulfill the criteria of an 
institutionalized democracy as sub-categories of democracy or phenomena in the middle 
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of the regime spectrum. Rather, it treats them as non-democratic regimes that are not in 
the process, or even of the intent, of engaging in democratization. The strength of this 
approach lies in the fundamental logic on which it builds the conceptualization; it defines 
regimes based on what they are and represent, rather than on what they lack and could 
come to possess. As in other multidimensional approaches, different types have been 
developed to capture the rich intra-variability. Hence, a means to this end is 
distinguishing non-democracies based on the presence and quality of elections.  Thus, if 
the state allows for some electoral competition, which logically entails that more than a 
single party is present and are participating in the political contestation, it can be termed 
electoral authoritarian regimes. The term electoral is used to distinguish the concept from 
regimes that are politically closed, while the term authoritarian emphasizes that they 
remain in the authoritarian spectrum despite this political opening. While most regimes 
have held elections, even if only to create an illusion of the existence of some level of 
public political participation, they do it on a much more limited scale. In contrast, 
electoral authoritarian regimes allow actual and competitive contestation for significant 
political positions (Schedler, 2009). Furthermore, political pluralism13 (even if limited), 
universal franchise, and multiparty competition are all hallmarks of electoral 
authoritarian regimes, where others more authoritarian regime types fail to provide these. 
Still, not all electoral authoritarian regimes are competitive, and the ones that merely hold 
multiparty elections without the actual contestation qualification are not considered 
competitive, but hegemonic regimes (Schedler, 2009).  
The case where there is actual political contestation have come to be termed 
competitive authoritarian regimes, which is a stricter approach to the idea of electoral 
authoritarianism.  In their extensive work on competitive authoritarianism, Levitsky and 
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Way (2010) differentiate this regime type from a full authoritarian one by arguing that, 
whereas the latter offers absolutely no means of contestation for power through legal 
means, the former offers channels through which there can be meaningful and inclusive 
competition for executive power by opposing groups. The activity of holding elections 
simply means that individuals are called at certain intervals to engage in the act of voting 
to choose from the individuals running for executive and legislative offices. On the other 
hand, the qualifiers meaningful and inclusive entail that (i) there is an entry point for new 
candidates and parties to join the political contestation, (ii) candidates and parties are of 
opposing ideologies and agendas, rather than extensions of the ruling group (Coppedge et 
al., 2011), (iii) outcomes are not predetermined, that is, the opposition has a chance of 
winning, (iv) voters can exercise their choice, and (iv) the results are not rigged in cases 
of unfavorable outcomes (Cheibub, Gandhi & Vreeland, 2010).  
Thus, oppositional activity is rarely restricted through violent means, and they are 
able to organize and conduct their campaigns openly. In addition, competitiveness also 
assumes that the offices of legislature and executive are filled by individuals voted into 
those positions, rather than by arbitrary means (Levitsky et al., 2010). Even more 
significantly, elections are regular. Nonetheless, free elections can be abused, civil 
liberties might not be provided or might be taken away when deemed necessary, and the 
playing field can be unfair. Hence, while competitive authoritarian regimes can uphold 
either two of these, violation of at least one of these attributes is what bars them from 
being considered democracies (Levitsky et al., 2010). Still, as long as the manipulation of 
elections, falsification of outcomes, and the present amount of fraud does not render 
voting itself as pointless, the regime will be considered a competitive one, rather than a 
fully fledged authoritarian regime.  
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This differs in the case of hegemonic electoral authoritarian regimes, where 
elections either lack competitiveness or do not exist at all. In the former case, elections 
mainly serve the purpose of boosting legitimacy and popular support from the population, 
while simultaneously being a useful device for distributing rents to supports (Brownlee, 
2004). Hence, oppositional parties do not have any ability to challenge the incumbents in 
hegemonic electoral authoritarian regimes. In cases where it is not clear whether a regime 
is an electoral authoritarian, or which subdivision it is, some scholars also utilize the idea 
of an ambiguous type in cases where there are conflicting classification of regimes or 
difficulty of clearly discerning between different non-democratic types.  
 
2.3.3 Typology III 
The last approach to be mentioned here and that has been used in the literature, is one that 
bases the distinction between nondemocratic regimes on the kind of the governing 
coalition, which comes with its own mixture of advantages and disadvantages. Namely, it 
usually produces the following regime types: military, single party, multiparty, personal, 
and monarchy (Huntington, 1991; Geddes, 1999; Magaloni, Chu & Min, 2013).  
Firstly, in countries where power is concentrated and is passed along a certain 
lineage (usually a noble), i.e. is hereditary, the regime is considered to be a monarchy. In 
fact, monarchies have been a very resistant and enduring regime type, being a dominant 
form of political organization for a much longer period than democracy or any of the 
non-democratic regimes (Brooker, 2013). Even though there is usually a royal family, the 
power tends to be placed mainly with the monarch, the king or the queen, who is not 
simply a figurehead but actually concentrates the executive power in his or her hands. 
Usually, other terms utilized to describe this type of ruling body are princes, emperor 
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(Rome), tsar (Russia), sultan (Ottoman Empire), emir etc. It is also important to note that 
monarchies have also evolved to adjust to the changing global environment, especially 
one where pressure for democratization is abundant. Hence, modern monarchies can also 
incorporate parliamentary assemblies, where the majority of the members were chosen 
through multiparty contestation, but where the prime minister (if in existence) is assigned 
by the monarch (Gelletly, 2013).   
Constitutional monarchy is the term that captures the essence of the power of the 
monarch — a power that is restricted by the constitutional processes. On the other hand, 
there are still monarchies where the ruler has all the authority and is not subject to any 
political body or rule and they are referred to as absolute monarchies. Sometimes, the 
upper classes, the business and political elite can act as a counter-balance (will be 
touched upon later). Countries like Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar and so forth fall under this 
category. These regimes are not inclusive or competitive.  
The military regime is a type in which the military or the armed forces hold the 
authority; that is, they hold effective power and state policy (Magaloni et al., 2013). But, 
the military does not need to be visibly at the top of the political chain in order for a 
country to be a military regime. The military can also opt to act behind the scene of a 
civilian government (indirect rule) while it pulls the string and decides on the state 
policies and functions, like Burma (Brooker, 2013, p.26). It can overthrow leaders that it 
perceives as a threat, either to the armed forces or to the stability or future of the country 
(Egypt). Furthermore, the military can also influence the election outcome by blocking an 
opposing party that would have otherwise won in free and fair elections. Nonetheless, 
there have been occurrences of military intervention into politics without it actually 
consolidating control after a coup d’état and the interference can be simply temporary 
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with the political power being transferred to the next political unit immediately (Brooker, 
2013).  
In single-party regimes, political positions and policy formulation is restricted to a 
single dominant party, even in the case that other parties exist and are allowed to run for 
office (Geddes, 1999). Traditionally, single-party regimes have outright forbidden the 
existence and participation of any other parties in the electoral process, with a 
representative example being North Korea. In other cases, a limited number of parties can 
participate, autonomous party branches may compete but cannot contradict the dominant 
party’s position, and so forth. Hence, in these situations where there is some room left for 
other parties to participate in contestation, the regime is considered to be the dominant 
party regime (Hadenius, 2007). One-party regimes tend to be cohesive and stable.  
Multiparty autocratic regimes of this type usually have a crossover with the 
electoral authoritarian regimes or competitive authoritarian regimes. Yet, in contrast to 
competitive authoritarian regimes, multiparty autocratic regimes are not necessarily 
characterized by the respect for civil liberties and the focus revolves around institutional 
features. This approach is inclusive of all opposition parties that participate in politics, 
rather than divide regimes into additional subcategories based on the extent of 
contestation (Michalik, 2015). Like competitive authoritarian regimes, elections can be 
restricted, the playing field can be uneven and so forth. Due to the limited nature of 
competition, they are often referred to as limited multiparty regimes, to differ from 
democratic regimes. Nonetheless, trying to make the same distinction between single and 
limited multiparty regimes can be a dubious task. Mainly, regimes can be dubbed 
multiparty regimes because of the existence of a plurality of parties and elections, but in 
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reality, could have a dominant party and therefore also fit the characteristics of a 
hegemonic regime (Wahman, Teorell & Hadenius. 2013).  
 
2.4 Economic and Human Development: Conceptualization 
 
Numerous economic growth models have been developed in the hope of explaining the 
diverging growth trajectories among countries. History, colonial legacy, weather, 
domestication of animals, and the availability of natural resources have all been posited. 
These factors offer great explanatory power if accepting the notion that the particular 
factors driving growth are time sensitive, and possibly, country or region specific. In 
other words, while in the 6th century geography was the determining factor, and in 9th 
century it was the technological advantage and the ability to stimulate industrialization. 
Following the end of Cold War, it was financial aid flows and linkages to the West 
(Bhalla, 2012). Yet, while having explanatory power in their own right, their ability to 
account for a general trend over time has been less successful and much harder to prove 
empirically.  Consequently, a set of widely agreed upon factors came to be identified that 
showed empirical evidence of stimulating growth. These were: i) physical capital, ii) 
human capital, iii) technological advancement (Lewis, 1955). A more current approach is 
to view economic growth as a determinant of demand and supply side factors, some of 
which are changes in total government spending, stock of capital goods, quantity and 
quality of resources and net imports.  
 Nonetheless, the idea of growth should not be conflated with economic 
development. For a long time, economic development in terms of GDP was seen as the 
key towards improving welfare within a country. The idea was that by improving the 
wealth of the nation, the benefits would eventually trickle down to lower income 
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individuals. This proved false (Meier & Stiglitz, 2001). The improvement in the national 
income did not account for many aspects that still hindered an individual’s wellbeing. 
Hence, a new strand of thinking emerged that defined development much differently. 
Amartya Sen made the crucial contribution by clarifying that development consists of a 
set of freedoms that increase human capabilities: (i) political freedom, (ii) freedom of 
opportunity, (iii) economic protections from negative freedoms such as poverty, disease 
and violence (Sen, 1999). Development became perceived as a human right (see UN 
Declaration on the Right to Development, 1986). Thus, economic development in terms 
of HDI is one of the most important policy goals countries pursue. Without improving 
education levels, access to water, sanitation, health care and many other services, nations 
cannot expect to develop. This study concentrates on development because it is one of the 
most important conditions for a stable and positive socio-economic and political 
environment.  
 Finally, throughout the chapter the study engages with the rule of law. It refers to 
a legal system where: (1) laws are public and applied equally, (2) the rules are stable and 
are not contradictory, (3) judiciary is independent and unbiased, (4) the government 
abides by the law, (5) governmental officials accept and respect the law, and (6) in case 
of abuse or unfairness by the government, individuals can use courts to prosecute the 
individual offenders (Siaroff, 2013; Fuller, 1977).  
In conclusion, it can be seen that political regimes present a diversity of patterns 
of organizing political life. In this chapter the main differences between regime types 
were discussed, as well as some challenges in terms of classification. Finally, 
development was established as the main factor of analysis. 
  
 
 
19 
 
3 Development Process and Modernization Theory 
 
Despite an extensive amount of research done on the relationship between regime type 
and economic performance, the academic scene remains largely divided. The academia 
remains puzzled by authoritarian regimes. A pressing question is what conditions allow 
authoritarian regimes to achieve remarkable economic performance? In a similar vein, 
studies assessing whether democracy leads to economic development and whether 
democracy is the superior form of governance have fared no better.  In fact, even the 
direction of the correlation between democracy and development is unclear; in other 
words, does democracy lead to development or development to democracy? The 
overarching question, however, remains to be the extent to which political regimes matter 
in development trajectories. 
The view of the superiority of democracy has gained the most prominence 
following the end of the Cold War. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the main challenge 
to democracy in terms of economic performance was eliminated. Democracy and 
capitalism prevailed.  New research and development policies promoted democracy as 
the most conducive form of social organization. It was only rational to think of 
democracy as a political goal — most of the developed countries were liberal 
democracies after all. There was a problem, however, with this line of thinking. Namely, 
the promotion of the Western liberal democracy overlooked differences between 
countries. The ideas of democratization were based on the understanding of the trajectory 
of West’s development. Yet, conditions present when Western nations developed were 
drastically different than those facing developing nations in modern times. The West took 
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a long time to develop, but the solutions offered for developing countries tended to be of 
a very rushed nature (Rodrik, 2007).  
Consequently, different sets of quick-fix policies were destined to fail to deliver 
the favorable outcomes expected; they did not account for the particular context in which 
they were to be implemented. Namely, for the Western countries, the Industrial 
Revolution led to drastic changes in the economic and social sphere which were to give 
way to liberal democracy. Indeed, when the Industrial Revolution occurred, Western 
European countries were liberal autocracies or semi-democracies at best; Britain had only 
an extremely small fraction of the population constituting the political franchise in 1830 
and only became a fully consolidated democracy in the twentieth century (Zakria, 1997). 
More importantly, it was only after the Industrial Revolution took place that Britain 
started to slowly dismantle its protectionist economic system; moreover, the process was 
gradual, with tariff and trade restrictions remaining until industry triumphed over 
agriculture (Frieden & Lake, 2002). Yet, many countries were coerced into neoliberal 
policies, such as economic opening to trade, at low levels of development through 
conditional loans by IMF or World Bank. Their main exports being primary goods, of 
great volatility,14 trade did not lead to many benefits as expected, and often harmed the 
struggling domestic sectors (Hailu, 2009). Hence, it is important to note that, when 
discussing the regimes today and the potential transformations they can pursue, the 
Western model should not be applied haphazardly.  
Historical trajectories and country composition15 need to be taken into account. 
Regimes differ structurally and understanding the importance and implications that 
regime type differences have is a key challenge to understanding the process of economic 
development. As the possibilities and capacities of countries are shaped by their past, and 
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as institution building has shown to be a long-term commitment, determining a set of 
good policies or important institutional factors could help increase the ability of countries 
to develop in more sustainable ways and in a more stable manner. Thus, the approach 
towards the role political regimes play in development needs to be approached with these 
reservations. The following section will present an important theory that has motivated 
the ideas behind this work—the modernization theory—as it helped stir economic theory 
towards certain problems of conflating regime types with strict economic outcomes. This 
analysis allows for theoretical analysis to be more easily developed in Chapter 4.   
 
3.1  Modernization Theory: The Case of Britain 
A short overview of the West’s developmental trajectory, with an emphasis on the 
experience of Britain, offers an important insight into the relationship between regimes 
and development. Most importantly, it conveys the gist of the modernization theory that 
shall be illustrated following this overview.  
It is a widely agreed upon matter that the industrialization process that the West 
underwent allowed it to make the technological advancement responsible for today’s 
modern metropolises, and nation-wide clean water access, high-tech and high-knowledge 
medical facilities, and longer life spans. One of the most important conditions for 
modernization was the presence of liberty.  The British system was able to guarantee 
such liberty, by having the power divided between the king, the aristocrats and the 
commoners, and more importantly, having a strong law and tradition to which even the 
monarch was compelled to respond16 (Ginsburg & Moustafa, 2008). This allowed for the 
assurance that property rights and freedom of enterprise would be safeguarded—all 
necessary conditions for the process of industrial revolution.   
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As industry expanded and migration from rural to urban areas increased, cities 
became the centers of economic activity creating modernized infrastructures that aided 
development. Simultaneously, urbanization created poor sanitary conditions, disease, and 
poverty, provoking a large dissatisfaction with the status quo. Additionally, however, 
industrialization created an educated middle class, the bourgeoisie, which together with 
the industrialists pressured the government for more political rights and economic 
freedom (Zakaria, 1997). Hence, the combination of the rise of an educated middle class, 
with a capacity to challenge the regime, together with increasing economic liberalization, 
caused by industrialization, facilitated an increase in political liberties. By remodeling the 
economic and social structures of the society and dismissing the hierarchical political 
structures, the British Industrial Revolution would change the world on an unprecedented 
scale. Soon, higher political and economic liberties allowed Britain to start transitioning 
to a liberal democracy. The suffrage was extended to the middle class in 1832, and again 
later—to the urban working class in 1867, agricultural workers in 1884 (Lizzeri, 2004), 
and to a subset of women in 1918 (those over 30 and owning property) and then to all 
women of legal age in 1928.  
Having the example of Britain in mind, the modernization theory can now more 
easily be discussed and understood. Writing in 1959, Seymour Martin Lipset articulated a 
theory that aimed to explain the process a country undergoes in its transition from a 
traditional or pre-modern society to a modern one. One of its critical assertions was that 
“the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances it will sustain democracy” (p.75). 
While often misunderstood, the idea was that countries that are more developed will be 
better able to consolidate and maintain democratic systems, not that development will 
necessarily lead to democratization. In other words, it argued that a certain level of 
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development is a critical prerequisite for any substantial social restructuring or political 
reform. A brief illustration of the argument follows.    
Industrialization and urbanization are some of the essential processes that a 
country experiences in its path towards development. Particularly, economic 
modernization generates a constant demand for better technology and innovation that 
fuels further advancements in the economy. One of the most important results is that 
increased literacy and higher educational attainment which creates a population of 
informed citizens with critical awareness of the socio-political conditions of the society. 
Rising prosperity creates a thicker layer of middle class and a business class, both of 
whom have a common vested interest in the economic performance of the country. 
Notably, as both cases can trace their improved economic situation and wealth to the 
economy, rather than special favors from the regime, they are highly independent of the 
government. Due to this, there is more pressure on the government to extend political 
participation to the population, usually through the means of voting. Thereby, the middle 
class is able to shape political outcomes by siding with moderate groups over extremists. 
Economic advancements also affect the working class, though more slowly, giving them 
more power and influence over politics. As the classes develop a strong and clear 
preference for democracy, they are able to greatly affect the political outcome 
(Rueschemeyer, Stephens E. & Stephens J., 1992). Coupled with greater overall wealth, 
and thus a lesser need for redistribution, the country is able to transition into a democracy 
without causing much distress for the elites.  
The other implication of the argument is that poorer countries will face great 
difficulties in transitioning to a modern society if potentially destabilizing political 
reforms are made. Since these countries have greater wealth inequality, sudden attempts 
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to transition from autocratic to democratic governance could excite a violent resistance 
from the rich, as it sparks fears of higher income redistribution. Also, the lack of a middle 
class that would act in a manner beneficial for the overall population, would make 
nepotism more lucrative and probable. Furthermore, colonized countries that immediately 
took up democracy after independence fared very poorly, because they were still quite 
unstable and poor, which soon led to the transition to dictatorships (Rueschemeyer et al., 
1992). In particular, illiteracy, high poverty rates and high ethnic fractionalization can 
derail positive reforms. In such an environment, a transition to a democracy can make the 
country a fertile setting for breeding conflict as groups, not yet fully supportive of 
democratic values, start competing for control over resources (Collier et al., 1998).  This 
will be further discussed in chapter 4.  
There are some interesting cases that are representative of the modernization 
theory. Firstly, there is the case of the South and North Korea. After becoming different 
entities, the South chose to pursue capitalist policies and provide secure property rights 
which resulted in high growth, while the North pursued a planned economy and 
inefficient policies that led to low income growth. The economic growth in the South 
allowed for the development of institutions that put constraints on the executive power, 
aiding its later transition into a democracy, while the North developed poorly and remains 
a closed and oppressive dictatorship (Glaeser et al., 2004).  Secondly, there is the case of 
Southern Europe. It was only after economic development changed the balance of 
political powers and created norms open to a different form of governance that 
democracy became the status quo in the region (Dahl, 1973). Lastly, Eastern European 
countries following the Cold War present a revealing case too. High-income countries 
that implemented democratization at a high level of income completed the process quite 
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quickly, while low-income countries, like Romania or Albania, are still not fully 
consolidated (Zakaria, 1997).  
In conclusion, this chapter reviewed the idea of modern development. It was 
argued that countries at higher levels of wealth are more likely to experience 
consolidation than low income countries. Finally, a few cases were discussed in terms of 
the modernization theory. 
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4 Regime Types and Development: Theory 
 
 
Most of the history of organized human society unraveled under autocratic governments, 
namely, monarchical rule. There were a few exceptions that occurred at different points 
of time in history. Firstly, the Greeks set themselves apart by constructing a democratic 
governance structure in midst of non-democracies. Then, during the classical and 
medieval period, Rome became a republic with a democratic aspect rather than a 
completely democratic system like that of the Greeks. Nonetheless, its political system 
was important and would be copied by many countries in the future; the US government 
is partially shaped on the Roman model.17 During the Renaissance, there were the 
mercantile republics, such as the Republic of Venice, the Republic of Genoa that adopted 
the republican form of government, followed by the Calvinist republics — the Swiss 
Confederacy, United Provinces, and other (Fratianni, 2005).  Most of these were of a 
short life span and, while political freedoms were increased over time, it was not until the 
end of WWI that European monarchies were stripped away and democratic governance 
set in.  
What followed in the aftermath of WWI is of particular interest. Namely, while the 
world experienced a decade of peace, with increasingly dire economic conditions and 
exclusion of defeated powers, democracy was abandoned once again. In fact, the 
democratic mechanisms served to dismantle democracy itself in Germany and Italy.  
And, as aforementioned, it was finally with the fall of the Soviet Union that democracy 
triumphed and became to be adopted in many countries, at least partially.18 Mostly 
guided by the correlation between democracy and development, the international 
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community supported the promotion of democracy, often with unanticipated results. The 
fact that many dictatorships which lack or have little experience with constitutional 
liberalism or capitalism are heading towards democracy has potential to create problems 
(Zakaria, 1997); and this is one of the most important contentions motivating this study. 
Furthermore, an additional problem stems from the one dimensional view of growth 
policies that. In order to decide whether democracy is the best governance structure for 
all countries at all points of development, the following sections will assess the 
relationship between democratic structure and development.  
 
4.1 Democracies and Development 
Democracies have been associated with higher economic growth (Nelson and Singh, 
1998; Dani Rodrik, 2005) and higher human development overall (Volmer et al., 2009; 
Kosack, 2003; Gerring et al., 2012). As shall be demonstrated throughout the chapter, the 
specific link between democracy and growth and between democracy and development 
remains contested (Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, Przeworski et al., 2000). Authors 
have also found a lack of causality with both of the economic factors, or a very weak one 
at most (Helliwell, 1994; Londregan, 1996; Przeworski et al., 1993; Barro, 1996; 
Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin, 2004).   
Democracies and non-democracies represent different rules and procedures for 
selecting leaders, managing conflict, drafting and implementing public decisions, and 
allocating resources (Schmitter & Karl, 1995). While autocratic regimes are often 
associated with a high concentration of power, any political entity strong enough to 
enforce property rights and maintain a monopoly of violence over its territory can also be 
seen as strong enough to violate the same rights of ownership of its people. Democracy is 
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a limited form of government, and while there does not exist a regime type where all 
single positions and seats are filled through elections, at least the chief executive office 
and legislative seats are designated through votes.  
Western democracies, or the liberal democracies, are also characterized by 
separation of powers, in the form of judiciary, executive, and legislature, together with 
the guarantee of basic liberties such as freedom of assembly, religion, speech, and so 
forth. But, the liberties preceded democracies. Namely, the Middle Ages had already 
produced aristocratic classes demanding certain guarantees from the monarch that even 
the absolute power could not violate. These guarantees were embodied in the Magna 
Carta, signed at the end of the 1215 civil war between powerful barons and the king. 
Specifically, it was the first document compelling an English king to abide by the rule of 
law (Johnson, 2015). It was these events of liberties granted to individuals in form of 
property rights and safeguards that lead to their incorporation into the constitution of the 
West to protect against other individuals and the coercive apparatus. Hence, just as 
liberty can be found under some autocracies, notable instances be identified where 
democratic procedures had devastating consequences for the population and the most 
quintessential freedoms of life were grossly violated. While free and fair elections are an 
essential component of democracies, they do not guarantee optimal outcomes. The 
elected individuals can be corrupt, produce inefficient policies, be shortsighted, engage in 
rent-seeking and demagoguery, fail to provide public goods, and engage in hostile foreign 
policy, all while the regime continues to fulfill the democratic criteria (Huntington, 
2012). Hence, democracy needs to be understood in an isolated manner from other 
elements of political life found among the democratic countries, but not part of the 
concept of democracy.  
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Nonetheless, in order to assess democratic governments as a whole, there needs to 
be evaluation of whether different forms of democracy produce significantly different 
results. According to Linz (1990) the presidential systems tend to have a winner-take-all 
approach. The executive office consists only of a single individual; the position of the 
head of government and head of state are held by the same individual (Linz, 1990). The 
president is directly elected and serves for a fixed term. Hence, in presidential systems, 
there is greater separation of power between the legislative and the executive branches. It 
has been argued that parliamentary systems with proportional representation produce 
party-aligned interest groups that are more concentrated, stronger political parties, more 
hierarchical administrative structures, decisive governance and more institutionalized 
rather than personalized leadership (Gerring, 2009). The higher number of veto players19 
in presidential democracies can arguably mean a higher number of restraint against the 
abuse of power. Increased credible commitment and increased transparency about 
political affairs are just some of the attributes associated with these systems of democracy 
(Knutsen, 2011); and together with increased checks on the executive, these can all be 
seen as favorable attributes for economic growth.  
While the debates about the superiority of either one of these systems are 
unresolved, there is some evidence, looking especially at Latin American presidential 
systems, that presidentialism could be a more optimal choice in developed and 
consolidated democracies but produce negative outcomes in less stable democratic 
situations (Persson, 2005).20 This system with proportional representation has often lead 
to the election of populist leaders who see themselves representing and speaking for the 
people, regardless of whether only a small fraction of the population has elected them—
when absolute majority is not needed21 (Zakaria, 1997). The president has the benefit of 
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bypassing the governmental structures and utilizing the referendum when in conflict with 
the legislature or courts. Moreover, deadlocks between the government and the 
legislature are more common because a president might not have sufficient support, or 
any at all, if their party is not strong in the legislature (Zakaria, 1997). Passing reforms 
that seek to correct inefficient policies or constrain rent-seeking, especially in less 
consolidated democracies, might be made difficult due to the president’s ability to veto 
laws passed in the legislature. In case of countries with proportional representation, 
conflict about legislations on particular contents of a reform proposal might lead to 
inaction as the issues is stalled in hopes of gains in the new government—no party 
usually holds a majority (Wintrobe, 1998). Furthermore, unlike parliamentary systems, 
where members of a party will always support their party’s government, presidents can 
find themselves not even being able to depend or gain support of their own party (Siaroff, 
2013).  
Consequently, such deadlocks can have negative effects on the survival and the 
stability of the regime as well as on its economic performance. In addition, presidential 
systems tend to lower taxation and public spending, which means that the quantity 
supplied of essential goods like education, healthcare, and social safety nets might 
decrease. This affects the wellbeing of the population, at least the worse-off segments 
(Persson et al., 2000). In contrast, the confidence requirement or the legislative 
consistency of parliamentary systems results in a higher provision of public goods and 
redistribution that better benefits the majority of voters, but with the increased tax burden 
(Persson et al., 2000). An additional level of instability is found among developing 
countries that mix presidential systems with proportional representation, resulting in 
populist leaders and multiparty systems—most prominent in Latin America (Zakaria, 
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1997).  It can be asserted, therefore, that presidential systems can be a better choice if 
accountability is needed to provide stability and support for government among the 
population, but parliamentary systems will perform better where there is a high need for 
public good provision, while mixed versions might be quite unpredictable.  
Similarly, the different manners of electing legislatures can have diverging results 
on performance. The most common majoritarian system is single-member plurality, 
where only a plurality of votes is needed to win the seat, and second place parties are not 
rewarded any seats. The main consequences arising out of majoritarian systems is their 
tendency to create an imbalance between the actual votes won and the seats obtained in 
the legislature, resulting in manufactured majorities (Siaroff, 2013). On the other hand, 
proportional systems utilize multimember districts and use a formula whereby the share 
of seats reflects the amount of votes obtained. Also, under the single transferable vote 
type, the amount of parties represented in the legislature is high and the votes are not 
wasted but redistributed. Nonetheless, the party-list system is the most common.  
When it comes to their performance, it has been asserted that multiparty systems 
(usually proportional representation) tend to produce a situation where no one party is 
able to dominate, so for any action to be instigated a compromise needs to be reached. 
What this entails is that, while many points may be on the agenda, all of them might not 
be resolved due to plurality of interests, and might cause inaction.  Hence, multiparty 
party systems can create higher presence of paralysis than a two party system (Wintrobe, 
1998). Moreover, precisely because it tends to create inaction, countries with highly 
proportional electoral systems tend to have high public debts (Raudla, 2010). Most 
important, however, is the potential that the inaction on policy matters relevant for the 
interest of the public can have on the political culture of a country. Namely, while 
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democratic regimes offer many liberties and safeguards, in times of economic downturns, 
it is crucial for countries to be able to respond well and wholly to the fears and needs of 
the population. Otherwise, if the inefficiency of the politicians creates a negative 
perception among the population, a vacuum is created whereby there can be two 
outcomes: (i) the country’s governing body is replaced by a leader or a revolutionary 
party that brings about an improvement in the situation following which democratic 
elections are reestablished and there is democratic transfer of power, or (ii) elections 
produce a rent-seeking Chief executives that leads to staggering negative outcomes 
(while potential still being beneficial for the economy, as in the case of Germany during 
1930’s). Hence, while democratic procedures are usually associated with checks and 
balances that guarantee civil liberties, that has not always been a case nor is it a rule 
(Zakaria, 1997).  
As shall be discussed at the end of the section, free elections in the Third Reich 
produced outcomes of such great magnitude that still serve as a cautionary reminder for 
the contemporary world. Similarly, in certain settings, the introduction of elections can 
bring about highly destabilizing results. Elections in Yugoslavia and Indonesia have led 
to the elections of demagogic presidents that have helped create more ethnic tensions 
among the population than had been present under strongmen preceding their 
“democratization” (Perry, 2012). As Richard Holbrooke, a US diplomat stated: “Suppose 
elections are free and fair and those elected are racists, fascists, separatists. That is the 
dilemma.” (Zakaria, 1997, p.17). Nonetheless, while proportional elections have been 
assumed to be more likely to create these inefficiencies, they have also been empirically 
associated with good economic outcomes. In fact, a transition to a democratic 
government with proportional elections, or simply a switch from majoritarian elections, is 
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associated with opening of the economy and better growth promoting structural policies. 
Lastly, proportional representation systems spend as much as 8% more of GDP on social 
security and welfare (Persson, 2006).  
In general, lasting democracies, that is, democracies that have been consolidated 
for a substantial time, have often been linked to desirable economic outcomes. Firstly, 
since democracies have a strong separation of power, which entails accountability to the 
public and supervision by other branches, democracies are expected to produce economic 
policies that benefit the majority. Namely, in democracies citizens elect their 
representatives under the assumption that they will act on their behalf by designing 
economic, social, and political policies that will safeguard their liberties and basic rights 
as individuals. Should the government prove to be inefficient and corrupt, the people can 
oust it peacefully through elections. This mechanism is believed to incentivized 
governments to produce good policies in order to get reelected. Consequently, 
democracies have been associated with better long term governance. 
 The accountability that characterized democracies is important for improving 
credibility and reducing uncertainty—both of which are crucial for creating a stimulating 
business environment. The size of the lower income layer is dependent on the level of 
income inequality of the society. By being responsive to a majority, and according to the 
theorem of the median voter, the pressing influence of the numerous lower income 
classes may lead to more redistributive outcomes from the rich to the poor (Bassetto et 
al., 2006). Resultantly, income inequality would decline boosting the ability of 
marginalized groups to partake in economic activity, thereby, according to growth 
models, indirectly stimulating higher output. Also, while redistribution can be damaging 
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to incentives of higher-earning firms and individuals, Adam Smith’s invisible hand and 
high levels of competition can compensate for its potentially negative outcomes.  
Apart from that, the institutions found in these democracies contribute to, and 
increase, competition and innovation by protecting private property, intellectual rights, 
incentives for investment and higher returns, lower barriers to entry, human capital, 
specialization, and judicial independence, hence inevitably driving up growth and 
development (Bassiouni, 1998). Specifically, democracies offer robustness through their 
ability to adapt to changing needs of the economy; as new information appears, 
adjustments and revisions are made so that current production processes can be 
improved. The former ensures that the population is able to enjoy continuously increasing 
life standards. Similarly, democratic economic and political institutions have been shown 
to have positive effects on human capital (Baum, 2003). By providing extensive goods to 
wider segments of the population, democracies create a competitive and educated 
workforce, often referred to as human capital, thereby stimulating the faces of innovation 
and technological advancement. In other words, they allow more specialized sector of 
economy to shape and grow, leading to higher economic growth and human 
development. Other than education, basic necessities like access to water, healthcare, 
food, and social safety nets are usually well-provided in democracies as their supply is 
placed upon the political agenda by the majoritarian structure of democracies—even 
becoming a crucial and constant component of governmental policy in social 
democracies.22 
In contrast to the entrenched or consolidated democracies stand transitional 
democracies. While consolidated democracies have stability both in the literal sense and 
in the policy-making of the country, transitioning ones often find themselves under 
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pressure from numerous challenges. Firstly, before this regime type can even be regarded 
as a democracy-to-be, it needs to have achieve some form of stateness; it has to be able to 
guarantee that it will be able to enforce a monopoly on violence and safeguard the 
country from sliding into instability during the transition period in order to keep resistant 
groups in check. Otherwise, as democracies are prone to political ‘instability’23 in general 
(though on a lesser scale in older, consolidated ones), the plurality that democracy brings 
about and the large presence of interest groups and instigation of independent links can 
prove harmful for political stability (Huntington 1991; Linz 1990; O’Donnell, 1994). 
That is why, while the legitimacy of democracy was increasingly recognized in the 
1980s, the democratization of surrounding countries did not entail the success of a 
country the latter are neighbors of—just its higher propensity to transition. In other 
words, while the two countries might have successfully transitioned and consolidated, 
that had not been a reason for the third to democratize if it lacked the conditions 
favorable for to it. While democracies can be found in diverse settings, if certain values 
and institutions are not present or braced by the people, such as tolerance, compromise, 
trust, diversity (acceptance of), the democracies will be less robust during crisis and more 
prone to breakdown (Diamond, 1997). The country might succumb to ethnic or political 
polarization. Particularly, new democracies are very vulnerable to demagogic appeals by 
politicians, as creating a sense of solidarity by creating a contrasting ‘otherness’ among 
the citizens has been shown to be the fastest route towards gaining political votes, even at 
the sake of violence. Unfortunately, this can lead to ethnic conflict and war (Peleg, 2007). 
Likewise, it may be crucial to maintain certain traditional or conservative primary 
institutions to preserve the legitimacy while new institutions specific to democratic 
societies emerge. In other words, by maintaining institutions (conservative and 
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integrating) associated with the previous regime, the new leadership can cushion 
alienation of certain groups from the new governance structure and its evolving political 
culture. The old institutions help by minimizing the perception by any one group that 
violent or forceful needs are necessary to access the political life—maintaining support 
from the elite layers that had been highly incorporated or coopted by the previous regime. 
But also, they help maintain expectations within normal ranges from those that had 
welcomed the transition—as to not result in quick disillusionment at first signs of 
turbulence (Lipset, 1959). The importance of gaining the approval of the aristocracy (elite 
and other layers with ability to influence political outcomes) was crucial in the 
consolidation of the English kings—and it is also a great factor to why they were able to 
consolidate much more quickly, while in Republic France those loyal to the regime 
rejected the new Republic (Lipset, 1959). 
 Nevertheless, while even consolidated democracies have been immune to 
unchanging amassment of self-interested lobbying, transitional economies can be riddled 
with it on an equal or higher scale than some autocracies. As Tullock argued, rent seeking 
is unproductive and destroys value by wasting resources because the rents captured imply 
an inefficient allocation of resources creating a deadweight loss (Tullock, 1980). In 
addition, while bribes also created inefficiencies in the economy, they have a temporal 
effect, while lobbying leads to permanent policy changes, and hence, is much more 
detrimental to society (Harstad, 2008). Moreover, as a society becomes increasingly 
dominated by special interest groups, it loses economic vigor and rapidly stagnates 
(Olson, 2008). Since democracies, especially presidential systems, tend to have a high 
number of veto players they can be more prone to the influence of interest groups in the 
political and economic spheres. Especially in transitional economies, those with financial 
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means are able to influence political outcomes in ways favorable to their economic 
leanings through using their wealth. Rather than aiding the economy, these special 
interests can inhibit growth-promoting policies that harm private interests but benefit 
overall society. Growth is harmed as production decreases from what would have 
optimally been produced had rent-seeking not affected policy decisions. It also creates 
incentives for future rent seeking and the allocation of resources to unproductive rent-
seeking activities (Stiglitz, 2015). Regrettably, the outcome is that corporate interests and 
short-term gains are put before long-term innovation and growth. The aforementioned 
reasons point to the fragility and inefficiency of transitional countries if particular 
conditions and policies are not present. Hence, it would be expected that transitional or 
new democracies would perform worse than stable autocracies.  
Yet, even the old democracies have not escaped criticism. Firstly, one of the most 
influential philosophers of the West and the original supporter of the idea of democratic 
peace, Immanuel Kant, was quite critical of democracies. Namely, he found democracies 
to be tyrannical and did not consider them a part of republic governments.24 They were 
not a part of the zone of peace that republican governments formed, especially as his 
concept of a proper republican government stressed the separation of legislative and 
executive power, not actual participation of all the people. What came to be considered 
the democratic peace was actually the liberal peace that came to be attributed to 
democracies later on. In his writing, Kant showed strong distrust of democracies, finding 
their majority rule neither peaceful nor desirable (Bushouse & Wiarda, 2005). Actually, 
he found them quite prone to aggressive actions — “The decisive preference of [the] 
median voter might well include "ethnic cleansing" against other democratic polities” 
(Bushouse, 2005, p.59).  
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Likewise, liberal thinkers, like John Stuart Mills, shared a similar position on the 
majority aspect of democracies. Mill’s followers embracing philosophical liberalism—in 
general the idea of inalienable set of freedoms and rights that cannot be revoked without 
affecting the greater good of the society—generally agreed that individuals were free to 
make bad decisions as long as any harm that they caused was restricted to the them 
(Brennan, 206). Yet, in democracies, the logic of voting was that all individuals that had 
the voting rights were to cast a vote, and where the majority of the votes converged, that 
would become the new status quo—at least until the following electoral period. Hence, as 
individuals do not have the same goals, needs or knowledge, they will not cast the same 
ballots nor will they be affected by the outcomes in the same manner. Should the majority 
be ill-informed and ignorant, they will inflict damage on not only the more educated and 
better informed individuals—those able to analyze the political candidates and their 
socio-economic agendas or plausibility of campaign promises—but also, the minority 
groups like immigrants, children, religious minorities, and so forth. An ignorant 
electorate can lead to unnecessary votes, pollution, waste of resources to overregulation, 
continuation of poverty, and many other unwanted outcomes.  
This negative view of the public was present even in Ancient Greece; Plato 
himself was afraid that the majority would be too irrational and ignorant to produce good 
governance. Unfortunately, the fear has been shown to be quite well-founded. Numerous 
empirical studies have shown that knowledge of politics tends to run low in the advanced 
democracies of today (Kinder, 1983; Achen & Bartels, 2002). Many individuals acquire 
information in a very biased and partisan way. The reason is that the costs of acquiring 
information are not compensated by personal and immediate benefits. While knowledge 
is readily available with technological advancement, especially in democracies, the voters 
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do not necessarily acquire knowledge in a critical manner. Despite these issues, citizens 
in some countries citizens are obliged to vote, where the failure to do so results in 
punitive action by the government. Similarly, individuals find that their freedoms are not 
of much substance if the offender is the government. In particular, citizens cannot escape 
governmental control and its enforcement of rules, even if it clashes with their wishes. On 
the other hand, interest groups are able to influence political outcomes. Politicians can 
fail to uphold their campaign promises, lie and manipulate, yet, they will not be removed 
nor face punishment (Brennan, 2016). Also, knowledge that can create and permit 
violence is readily available to everyone, but governmental policy tends to lack 
transparency. Thus, it is easier to access information necessary for building a bomb than 
access governmental records. As Zakaria put it, democratic governance also brings about 
the democratization of violence (Zakaria, 1997).  
Secondly, since politicians that fail to bring about stable and positive growth face 
a bleak chances of re-election, it is possible they are willing to sacrifice future outcomes 
in order to enjoy better current developments. Specifically, as politicians in a democracy 
have their terms limited to a certain period, they face shorter time horizons than in stable 
autocracies. This means that the former are incentivized to improve economic conditions 
during their term or just before elections, regardless of the costs at which such 
improvements come. Democratic leaders might artificially create booms of the business 
cycle by over relaxing regulatory measures, overspending, maintaining low interest rates, 
and lowering income taxes, regardless of whether these policies have negative long-term 
effects.  
This could explain why democracies tend to be more vulnerable to financial 
crisis. As democracies are characterized by high information transparency in the financial 
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market and credible commitment to credit, the easy access to credit and the lower costs of 
borrowing increase the propensity of speculation attacks while the unfettered flow of 
information allows for a tendency for panic as consumer confidence plunges during times 
of financial difficulty (Lipscy, 2011). Both of these outcomes can be very destabilizing 
for the economy. In contrast, for instance, during the monarchical system, England had a 
low rate of taxes as the king was able to spend but not tax, and Parliament could tax but 
not spend, maintaining a balance on the extent of expenditure. However, following the 
democratic transition, its tax rate has risen (Öjendal, 2009). Nonetheless, even when 
democratic leaders attempt to correct these problems, they can face high costs. Namely, 
the implementation of stricter policies to help the economy recover might be opposed by 
the population that views it as an infringement on their basic needs, rights and freedoms, 
and political leaders are often hesitant to implement these knowing the damage they will 
do to their political careers. The vulnerability of democracy to financial turmoil can be 
seen very well in the last financial crisis of 2008. The fact that governments bailed out 
banks with the money collected from the people, without any consequences faced for 
their risky behavior, made many disillusioned (Barofsky, 2013). 
Thirdly, democratic countries have also been linked to inaction and a lack of 
credibility, but on a lesser scale than other regimes. It is important to note, however, that 
while inaction and a lack of credibility can be extremely high at points and quite 
destabilizing to the system, they are rarely the general trend in long established 
democracies. Rather, there is a high propensity for dissatisfaction and aversion to 
political rule from the population, especially as the democratic system embeds high 
expectations into its population. Citizens in democracies elect representatives to place 
their needs on the political agenda (Cassels, 1975; Holtfreirich, 1990).  Yet, as 
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aforementioned, parties might not want to bring up new legislation on certain issues in 
fear that, if it does not pass, it might be modified into a much more undesirable version. 
Or, they might not want to threaten the status quo in case they get elected. As a result, 
voters’ demands are suppressed, and while democratic regimes do not suppress voter 
preferences like authoritarian regimes are likely to do, the end effect remains the same—
voters’ wishes are not realized. Inability of political parties to satisfy the needs of citizens 
are especially apparent at times of turbulence, putting the survival of the regime under 
pressure. The power vacuum created by the paralysis of democratic parties is often 
eagerly filled by extremist candidates ready to offer immediate action and quick 
solutions; the population becomes drawn to them precisely because they believe that the 
extremists will act and, especially, bring economic embitterment (Zakaria, 1997).   
The infamous example of the vulnerability of democracy can be traced back to 
Germany following the Great War. Namely, in 1932, the Nazis won both of the national 
elections, and again in 1933, marking the beginning of a horrific genocide and the lead up 
to the Second World War (O'Loughlin, Flint & Anselin, 1994). Ironically, the events that 
unfolded can be traced back to the Versailles treaty. The victorious countries, most 
important of whom were the US, followed by France and Britain, placed an enormous 
economic burden on the Germany economy, decimated any sense of dignity of the 
German population, and put embarrassing requirements on the country. From the 
Versailles Treaty till the Great Depression of 1930, the liberal and more democratic 
countries of the West kept taking action that was directly or indirectly fueling the sense 
of injustice and anger among the Germans—probably the French invasion of the Rhine 
conveys the aforementioned well— culminating with the hyperinflation that shook 
Germany to its core.  Consequently, the Great Depression delivered the last blow, and 
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Germany came to quickly be consumed by a fascist, racist movement: Nazism. Ironically, 
the Nazi party came to power with the help of all of the democratic tools, made available 
by the Weimar Republic; this allowed the Nazis to organize themselves and spreading 
their allure as far as possible. What followed is the well known tragedy of the history of 
mankind. In addition, after World War Two ended, Germany was ravaged economically, 
socially, psychologically and politically. What is worse, that was not the end. The Cold 
War divided the fabric of the society brining many years of isolation between the West 
and the East. What is important to note is that it would have been hard to predict the 
future of Germany without the advantage of hindsight. Namely, the Great Depression 
ushered in extremists in most of the countries, even the most liberal of all. Hence, had 
those same countries underwent through “twenty years of defeat, humiliation, chaos, 
economic depression, and the evisceration of their middle class” they would have 
probably ended up in a similar vein—governed by ultra-fascists (Zakaria, 1997, p.67).   
 
4.2     Non-democratic Regimes and Development  
 
 
 
It has taken the developed countries a long period of time to develop the strong 
institutions that they currently have. Having that in mind, it might be quite unreasonable 
to demand that the developing world attain those same standards as a condition for 
development. Perhaps it would be better to recognize and accept the fact that today’s 
developing countries are following a path of their own—one that will not necessarily 
reflect the experience of the West—which mirror their unique combination of 
demographic, socioeconomic and political conditions. These countries, even as non-
democratic and highly centralized entities, are not simply intent on quick rent extraction 
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regardless of the costs; the binary distinction between democratic and dictatorship or 
autocracy allows too many important details and discrepancies to be obscured. Many 
poor dictatorships have been achieving high growth performances; autocracies like China 
are improving and enriching the lives of their population, lifting millions out of poverty 
and helping the middle class grow (Gilson, & Milhaupt, 2011). Rather than having its 
intellectuals and artists fleeing its borders, the Chinese government is harvesting their 
potential by facilitating their progress, thereby incorporating the middle layer into the 
state apparatus (Kupchan, 2012).   
The slowdown of democratic transitions, the durability of non-democratic 
regimes, and the impressive performance on certain autocracies in contrast to certain 
democracies highlights the importance that these regime structures will continue to play 
in the indefinite future. Moreover, the leveling off the rate of country transition to 
democracy signaled the waning influence of democracy, as successful autocratic regimes 
rose up to present an alternative. Namely, the pressure for democratization in the 90’s 
combined with the drive for survival the regimes themselves possessed led to the creation 
of a whole new spectrum of authoritarian regimes; the hybrids. However, in some places 
(Latin America) the level of human development and liberties had worsened, as countries 
lacking any experience with liberalism or capitalism had started transitioning to 
democracy (Zakaria, 1997). Likewise, the overt emphasis on multiparty elections in 
democratizing countries and the neglect of the most essential precepts of liberal 
governance was occurring throughout African countries. But, as the precepts are harder to 
obtain due to lack of economic or constitutional development in these countries, the 
resulting outcome has been illiberal democracy, with the spectrum ranging from very 
modestly illiberal regimes like Venezuela to purely tyrannical like Kazakhstan (Zakaria, 
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1997). Hence, in many African countries, moves toward democracy stirred challenges to 
the authority of the state, creating ethnic challenges to the state rule. In other cases, like 
Central Asia, the elections simply gave legitimacy to power seizes; nevertheless, in cases 
of some South-Eastern European countries like Croatia and Slovakia, the adoption of 
illiberal democracy led to further movement towards more liberal and constitutional 
reform, with the democratic element (Zakaria, 1997). Consequently, the transition to a 
hybrid regime can either cause further liberalization as the democratic institutions take 
hold and are able to influence performance, or the democratic institutions will operate but 
the regime mechanism will have a stronghold over their ability to spur significant 
political change. In other words, the governments will be changed but the regime will 
not.  
Yet, authoritarian regimes, from capitalist authoritarian to competitive 
authoritarian, have proven to be compatible with growth and development. Following the 
recent financial crisis, the West struggled to recover and fix their broken deregulatory 
framework that greatly contributed to the crisis at the same time that vested interests 
made it difficult to implement much needed reforms of health care, taxes, pensions and 
other essential long-term factors, while China emerged largely intact thanks to its central 
planning, high savings rate and surpluses (Kupchan, 2012). Moreover, many of the now 
democratized countries were autocracies at the time of their development. Specifically, 
the East Asian economies of Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, together 
with the capitalist authoritarianism in China have all been striking successes of the last 
decades. The following chapters will consider the successes, failures, mechanisms, and 
overall performance of authoritarian regimes. 
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First authoritarian regimes have a much larger capacity for executing policies, 
whether beneficial or damaging to growth and human development. Namely, 
governments in non-democracies can find means to circumvent opposition to their 
policies at a much lower cost than democracies.  In the latter, there can be inaction due to 
lack of support or agreement on what should be done or due to strongly polarized 
viewpoints. This threatens to cause decreasing trust in the government among the 
population, triggering more inaction as a result. In contrast, in the face of resistance, the 
authoritarian regimes can either coopt the opposition, or repress it, effectively bypassing 
it and implementing the desired policy (Wintrobe, 1998). Following that logic, it can be 
seen that authoritarian regimes are more capable of enforcing rapid reforms to the 
economy, be they the implementation of export-oriented policies (Singapore) or the 
transfer of power to the market system from a state-dominated approach (Chile). 
Actually, the successful transitions from Import Substitution Industrialization to export-
led industrialization was largely facilitated by the capitalist developmental state that 
allowed for effective cooperation between labor, the industrialists, and the state, while 
minimizing systematic vulnerabilities (Saez, 2009). Furthermore, the efficiency potential 
is higher under autocratic regimes, as “the premium to deter cheating is smaller in a 
dictatorship than in a free society” (Wintrobe, 1998, p. 4). Namely, the greater monopoly 
power the state has over the economy and firms, especially in the form of higher public 
ownership, the greater the costs of cheating as there are fewer alternatives to turn to after 
being caught. Indeed, the tools of autocracies tend to be more extensive, from rewards 
and sanctions to monitoring mechanisms. Yet, while wrongly assumed to be simply tools 
of coercion used at the slightest whim of the autocratic government, these tools are 
actually means of gaining loyalty from employees. Motivated by the ability to gain rents 
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and kept in check by the threat of sanctions, loyal workers compete with each other in 
executing the policy of the system (Wintrobe, 1998) 
Also, autocratic regimes can provide the environment necessary for crucial 
economic and financial activities to take place that lead to long-term growth and 
development. Autocrats are equally capable of attracting foreign direct investment 
through utilizing different credibility mechanisms that replace the role of the legislature 
of democracies. In the case of countries that transitioned into the hybrid regimes, there 
are already mechanisms in place as they share the three branches of democracies—
although less efficient and sound versions of these institutions. Nonetheless, the 
institutions present in these regimes do not serve as mere window dressing as has been 
suggested, but rather, form crucial conditions and provide feedback necessary for 
creating effective policy and state credibility (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007). Perhaps, 
therefore, it might not be the democracy per se that provides the condition necessary for 
economic activity, be it foreign direct investment or capital investment, but certain 
institutions that are present within democracies. And moreover, those institutions can also 
be present and compatible with autocratic governance. While this work critically assesses 
political regimes, where it will argue in favor of the capability of non-democratic regimes 
to achieve good economic performance, the conclusion to be taken away is not that the 
study renders justification for long-term authoritarian rule; merely, it simply highlights 
that regimes per se are not the main determinants of economic performance, and in 
certain settings and point of development, a certain regime type might be more fitting 
than the other.  
Regardless, while authoritarian regimes are able to achieve impressive economic 
results, as shown above, the next question becomes what incentives do they have to 
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implement such policies rather than use their higher political power to extract the highest 
amount of rents at the expense of the general population. The answer to this question 
contains several points. For one, autocratic rule can execute policies without any support 
whatsoever.  In fact, as leaders or parties that have taken power without the electoral 
process, they must maintain a substantial semblance of legitimacy by refraining any 
extreme action that might undermine it, as well as by averting outside attempts that 
would have the same effect. Hence, even if authoritarian regimes do not face the same 
constraints or challenges like those of democratically elected governments, they still need 
to interact with their citizens or risk facing a rebellion. This interaction is based on the 
following logic: (1) there are marginal returns to the use of repression, (2) there is a 
trade-off between the use of repression and the loyally to the regime and (3) as the use of 
repression increase, the costs of rebellion decrease (Wintrobe, 1998). Therefore, to a 
certain extent, autocrats are forced to (and often willing to) take the needs of the society 
into account. After that point, the amount of concession and welfare provided for the 
citizenry will vary. The more the government values future returns over current 
consumption, the more likely they will be to achieve favorable outcomes (longer time 
horizons). In the cases where the regimes have external sources of revenue, they will 
need to cooperate less with the population, and individuals taking power in resource-rich 
countries will tend to have short time horizons. In contrast, rulers that gain their revenue 
from inside the country will have longer time horizons and will be more motivated to 
cooperate with the citizens. That is, as the autocrat gains the rent from the economy, he 
will be more motivated to pursue policies that increase the wealth of the economy on a 
whole, as thereby, he increases the size of his own wealth as well (Olson, 2008). 
Moreover, the wealthier the country is, and the more welfare the citizens receive, the 
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lesser the risk of disorder and rebellion. This is of great benefit to the autocrat as he will 
be able to extract revenue without wasting resources on repression. In short, the rulers 
will be willing to reinvest a part of the revenue into provision of social welfare in order to 
secure their wealth and personal security. Lastly, regimes that gain their revenue from 
capital and whose supporters are largely capital owners are very likely to be future 
oriented, as pursuing growth enhancing policies will increase the wealth of capital for all. 
As well, the increase in growth and capital will increase the value of labor, leading to 
higher real wages for labor and increasing the welfare of workers (Dahl, 2003). It is 
interesting to note that, for example, a reform passed by the military regime in Brazil to 
extend health care insurance and social security to the rural population in 1971 had 
previously failed to pass under a democratic government (Falletti, 2009) 
Yet, in order to instill confidence into their population and interest external 
investors, thereby creating conditions for economic growth and development, there need 
to be checks and balances. While in democracies, these institutions are well established 
and function relatively well, autocratic regimes comprise a much more distinct set of 
countries and are often assumed to lack such mechanisms. Still, autocratic regimes can 
have high restraints as well, and apart from the extreme ends of the spectrum, can 
formulate good policies. Nonetheless, the extent and type of constraints vary. Autocrats 
cannot simply rely on repression, as not only does it have marginal returns, but its costs 
increase the larger the opposition. Namely, while a small amount of repression can in fact 
increase loyalty to the regime, as it increases the costs of defection, at high levels of 
repression, loyalty is replaced by fear and support decreases. Not only that, but in order to 
repress, the government has to have funds to convert into power (to repress), but this 
conversion is also subject to diminishing returns. In addition, a coerced population will 
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forgo making the investments or savings necessary for the proper functioning of the 
economy (Wintrobe, 1998).  While the option to bribe the potential opposition is present, 
it becomes less and less feasible the larger the size of the group that has to be bribed. 
Thus, the constraint comes from the winning coalition whose interests are highly 
dependent on the performance of the government and who can discipline the dictator 
should they choose bad policies for private gain.  This coalition is usually formed out of 
individuals with a significant capability of affecting political outcome and enough 
independence that they can threaten the autocratic government’s survival (De Mesquita, 
2005). These are also sometimes referred to as veto players in the literature, and, as 
Tsebelis shows (1995, 2002), the number of veto players in autocracies can be as high or 
even higher as in democracies. Regardless, the stronger the selectorate and larger the 
winning coalition, the stronger the check on the autocrat, especially as this makes bribery 
unfeasible and overtly costly (Gallagher & Hanson). The winning coalition is composed 
out those individuals on whose support the survival of the leader depends, and these 
individuals come from the selectorate (those able to select the leader). In cases where 
autocracies approach pure personal power, there is likely to be no winning coalition and 
nobody to compromise with, so the leader will have complete freedom to dictate the 
policy, and the outcomes are likely to be negative (De Mesquita, 2005). Development is 
the most likely to suffer the greatest. 
Usually in the case of hybrid regimes, it is the legislatures and the parties that 
serve as constraints on the monopolistic leanings of the autocratic government. That is, 
rather than merely being a cover for authoritarianism, these institutions do constrain. In 
fact, many autocrats spend a significant amount of money to hold elections, maintain 
legislatures, and create institutions that facilitate promotion and election of leaders 
 
 
50 
(Jensen, Malesky & Weymouth, 2014). While even in cases where elections were held 
due to the international pressure, to gain benefits like aid or military investments at the 
costs of imitating democracies without any substance, elections have proven to be quite 
useful. Even very flawed elections can become a potent ground for opposition groups to 
collectively organize on. On the other hand, parties are also of enormous benefit to the 
autocrat, as they are the mediums through which patronage can be distributed and elite 
cohesion maintained (Gandhi, 2007a). More importantly, parties can also have a 
lengthening effect on the time horizon of the supporters as the parties offers opportunities 
for career advancement, and through that, parties are able to make cooperation more 
attractive than defection (Levitsky, 2010). Consequently, parties and elections become 
effective ways to diminish the commitment issue that autocratic governments battle, by 
encouraging and facilitating power sharing between the autocrat and his rivals. By 
delegating political power to rival parties and vesting them with the ability to challenge 
abusive leaders, autocrats are able to increase the credibility of their power sharing and 
resolve the commitment problem. The legislature is also crucial for solving the problem 
of asymmetric information. As autocracies show credibility either through adopting 
legislatures or having a powerful selectorate, their economies will grow at higher rates 
and will be able to attract substantial FDI inflows, both of which create jobs and aid 
stability (Magaloni, 2010). This is because foreign investors are more confident that their 
property rights will be respected and their earnings will not be expropriated. Importantly, 
economic friendly policies and strong market economy institutions are essential 
conditions for these efforts to translate into economic progress. Wright (2008) argues that 
that military and single-party regimes tend to possess a smaller amount of natural 
resources and thus are more dependent on economic performance and more likely to 
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cooperate with the population. Hence, they are also more likely to adopt assemblies that 
constrain them. Accordingly, the presence of these institutions and their constraining 
effects improve the economic performance of the country by providing credible 
commitments. Finally, monarchies and personalist regimes do not generally possess these 
binding institutions, and hence, they tend to hinder economic performance (Wright, 
2008).  
The presence of certain institutions or factors associated with democracies has 
been argued to improve economic growth and encourage development. The first 
institution is the presence and protection of property rights. The former is of exceeding 
importance as they form the basic condition for both economic growth and economic 
development. Indeed, throughout history the right to private property has been viewed as 
citizen’s inalienable right (though many individuals were disempowered like women and 
slaves). The significance of property rights rests on certain basic economic assumptions 
about human behavior. Namely, individuals are rational creatures in pursuit of self-
interest. Subsequently, in order to expand their resources in any kind of economic 
activity, they will need to receive compensation. However, individuals will not be willing 
to make the exchange if they will not receive their end of the deal. Hence, property rights 
provide this assurance that the labor individuals exchange will be compensated with 
income. The protection of private property will also stimulate savings within the 
economy which is needed for other economic processes, most important of which is 
investment. Like individuals, firms will not be willing to invest if their profits will simply 
be confiscated afterwards. However, without investment and savings the economy will 
not grow, nor will individuals be able to maintain even a semblance of decent livelihoods. 
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This simplified representation of economic behavior conveys the importance that 
property rights play in the development of countries.  
While property rights are seen as almost an indivisible part of democracies, the 
idea that democracies protect property rights is a recent invention (Przeworski et al., 
1993). Autocratic regimes have proven to be capable of providing sound property rights. 
Indeed, there are several reasons as to why autocratic regimes would be motivated to 
protect property. As aforementioned, when autocratic governments have longer time 
horizons, they tend to prefer giving up current consumption in order to reap higher future 
gains. Even if assuming only a self-interest motive on the part of the autocrat, he will not 
wish to change taxation to an extent that the drop in future income is higher than the 
increase in current income. Since governments collected revenue through taxing the 
population, should the taxation increase to a high level, individuals will have short time 
horizons and will choose to consume most of their incomes immediately. Hence, they 
will be discouraged from being productive as their earnings will be appropriated 
regardless. Resultantly, if the tax rate eliminates incentive for production, there shall be 
nothing produced and therefore nothing to collect, and future production stops. Therefore, 
governments will choose to abstain from excessive expropriation and will only tax up 
until the point where marginal benefit equals the marginal cost (Olson & Kähköhnen, 
2000). Thanks to this, the autocrat will be able to profit more from the returns on 
investments in the future and the innovation-led growth that will result from secure and 
enforced property rights. Not only that, but the invisible hand, or the encompassing 
interest, will make the autocrat use a part of his resources and provide public goods for 
those whom he taxes, in order to stimulate their productivity and innovation (education) 
and thereby his own returns. The extent to which there is an overlap between the interests 
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of the autocrat and the citizens is quite surprising. Yet, it is quite logical if one grasps the 
fact that most of the human history occurred under autocratic rule (Borner et al., 1998). 
Another theoretical approach is to view the government as a good. Namely, in 
democracies, governments represent a public good as barriers to entry are lower and the 
government is seen as the property of the people. Public goods are associated with the 
properties of non-rivalry and non-excludability in the literature which lead to the tragedy 
of commons and hence to inefficiency, depletion, inadequate provision, maintenance, and 
so forth. If allowing for the assumptions that democratic governments are public goods 
with mentioned properties, then it follows that they will lead to an overt emphasis on 
current over future consumption, meaning a shorter time horizon. In other words, 
democratic rules are current users of government resources, but do not own it. Hence, 
unlike the autocratic leader, the democratic leaders will have no interest in maximizing 
the overall government wealth, but only the current income. As once he leaves he will no 
longer be able to consume it, he will maximize his use of government resources while in 
office and will attempt to use as much as possible as quickly as possible. This leads to 
constant decreases of the country’s capital structure (Hoppe, 2001).   
There are also differences within the different nondemocratic regimes themselves. 
In political structures where the ownership of country is determined by hereditary 
procedures, the ruler should have a higher incentive to restrain himself from any activity 
that would hamper the growth of the country due to the fact that the state of economy that 
his governance produces will be the one inherited by his future lines. This was the case of 
Europe with its dynastic lines of Royal families. Therefore, generally, wherever a ruler 
satisfies the long horizon condition, he will undertake action to convince the citizens that 
their property will not be expropriated by the autocrat, because if the citizens fear losing 
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their belongings they will not have an incentive to produce and the autocrat will collect 
no taxes (Hoppe, 2001). Yet, hybrid regimes like competitive authoritarian regimes are 
expected to have the best provision of property rights among the non-democratic regimes 
as its legislature works as a credible check on government’s behavior. Specifically, 
authoritarian legislatures create added veto points that constrain the government, 
providing investors with confidence that their property rights will be honored. Precisely 
this ability of institutions to provide stability and structure to human interaction, and 
through that set the rules of the game, autocrats have an incentive to create institutions, 
thereby, providing credible commitment that they will uphold property rights (Gandhi et 
al., 2007a).  
Likewise, of as equal importance for a country’s developmental trajectory is the 
presence of institutions of rule of law; where these institutions enjoy at least some degree 
of autonomy from the executive. Thought not noted often, rules depend on order and 
obedience (Vining, 2008). If the obedience is not willingly forwarded, it can be 
compelled through more coercive means. As Lynne Henderson argues, “the Rule of Law 
may be malicious or benign, and laws and rules may be harsh and punitive or 
humanitarian” (Henderson, 1991, p.400). Hence, authoritarianism is not incompatible 
with rule of law. Even the United States under the rule of law had inflicted violent 
offenses against different populations, such Native Americans and African Americans 
(Henderson, 1991). Nonetheless, the rule of law needs to constrain governmental actions 
to an extent to ensure governmental credibility and increase confidence among the 
population.  
As the legitimacy of nondemocratic regimes is often questioned, the preservation 
of judicial institutions can signal the existence of restraints on the executive. For instance, 
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the Chinese Communist party used the judicial system to build legitimacy for the central 
government following the end of Mao’s rule (Wu, 2009). Moreover, these institutions 
have numerous other functions that are essential for successful governance of a regime. 
The presence of courts is mutually beneficial to the government and to the citizenry; they 
can minimize or resolve coordination problems, provide space for negotiation and 
grievance between individuals and the regime, improve the circulation of information, 
encourage investment, and facilitate trade (Ginsburg, 2008). Because the process of 
information collection is made difficult in autocracies due to the absence of discovery 
mechanisms such as free media, courts act as an excellent substitute by providing 
information on the misdeeds of subordinates to the higher levels. This allows the higher 
ranks to prevent excess and extortion of bribes from lower levels by having private 
parties or prosecutors communicating these offenses through the judicial system. Legal 
systems that are able to disclose abuses by officials boost leader’s reputation and extract 
higher support from the people. 
 Furthermore, courts can monitor and punish violations of property rights, 
increasing the efficiency of the economic environment.  Actually, the presence of courts 
that are relatively strong and independent minimizes the occurrence of expropriation as 
they are likely to rule against the state when grievances are brought before it, and is less 
likely to approve of laws that would have damaging effects. In fact, courts support 
economic progress by providing a stable environment where the commitment to the 
enforcement of property rights and contracts is stable and predictable (Ginsburg, 2008). 
Consequently, the judiciary participates in the process of development by facilitating 
investment transactions, enhancing revenue collection and reducing the costs of credit to 
the state. But most importantly, autocratic regimes are not only able to advance and 
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strengthen their commitment to private property but are also able to utilize courts for 
capping any activist tendencies and political opposition that could threaten the robustness 
of the overall political structure. As hybrid regimes have adopted judiciary institutions 
taking advantages of the benefits they deliver to the regime, they are most likely to 
perform best in terms of protecting private property, attracting capital, and stimulating 
economic activity (Shapiro, 2008). Indeed, some of the greatest economic successes 
among the non-democratic ranks, like Singapore and China, have provided rule of law 
and property rights. For a resource-less country like Singapore, rule of law has played a 
crucial role in its growth trajectory. The great amount of foreign capital coming into the 
country can largely be attributed to the ability of the courts to provide credibility and 
legitimacy necessary for business processes.  The judiciary is well-educated. But also, it 
avoids politics-oriented battles with the regime that might threaten that freedom 
(Ginsburg, 2008). Should the judiciary still step out of line, the government can use the 
constitutional amendment which requires only two thirds of the Parliament to neutralize 
the damage.  Furthermore, by upholding the Fuller’s eight formal criteria for upholding 
the rule of law, it has made it possibly to keep the court in check while enjoying the top 
placement in the world on the Ease of Doing Business Index by the World Bank.  As 
Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew argued, judiciary institutions and the rule of law are essential 
for attracting foreign capital and providing confidence for foreign investors, both of 
which is essential for prosperity and economic growth of a country.  
The aforementioned ties into the idea of economic freedom, a factor that has been 
shown to be heavily correlated with economic growth, as well as human development 
(Kim, 2007). Namely, economic freedom is the ability of individuals to pursue their 
economic prosperity without coercive intervention from the government or economic 
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authority. The extent to which the degree of economic freedom varies between regime is 
quite stochastic. While the majority of democratic countries provides substantial 
economic freedoms, they do not form a dichotomous distinction with the autocracies in 
this respect. As aforementioned, Singapore is the leading country in terms of the business 
environment and takes the second place on the overall Economic Freedom Index. 
Following the previously developed theory, it can be seen that regimes with (i) longer 
time horizons (durability), (ii) institutional constraints, and (iii) bigger winning coalitions 
will tend to have higher economic freedoms. Actually, autocracies might be preferable in 
the early stages of liberalization as democratic electorates are slow on accepting 
economic reforms (de Haan et al. 2003). Firstly, if the autocratic values future returns on 
investment better than current consumption, he will be more willing to liberalize the 
economy as it will create a more efficient economic environment (as shown in Chapter 
3), higher consumer and investor confidence, investments and economic advancement. 
Further, by providing economic freedom, he may benefit from the spillover effect 
economic freedom has on welfare. Increases in the freedom and opportunity to actively 
engage in the economic society may increases the social welfare of the society by 
allowing for the entrepreneurial processes necessary for prosperity (Stroup, 2007). 
Economic freedom can have a strong, positive effect on the quality of life, and has been 
shown to foster development in terms of adult literacy, life expectancy, morality rate and 
disease prevention (Nikolaev, 2014). In addition, countries with higher economic 
freedom are positively correlated with foreign direct investment (Caetano et al., 2009), as 
there is more transparency and more confidence in the legal system for protection of 
propriety. Lastly, economic liberalization policies such as dismantling of trade barriers, 
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deregulating markets, and reducing other protectionist policies, can be implemented by a 
leader seeking to increase his legitimacy among the people (Stokes, 2001).   
 
4.3  Case Studies 
4.3.1 Brazil 
 
Latin America has been a frustrating region for economists and political scientists alike. 
The inability of the three biggest economies (Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico) to transition 
to democracy has been confounding.  In less than two centuries, Brazil underwent a 
spectrum of regime changes: “it was a colony, an independent monarchy, an oligarchical 
republic, a populist military dictatorship, a democracy with a weak presidency, a right-
wing military dictatorship and a democracy with a strong presidency” (Przeworski, 2001, 
p.9). Its first experiment with democracy in 1946 did not fare well, resulting in a military 
coup and a return to autocracy. Following this event, the country underwent 2 years under 
a military regime. But, the new regime that was adopted in 1985 was a democracy. It was 
able to handle well and within a democratic framework issues and challenges that 
occurred, and had a better performance in terms of civil liberties and accountability. 
Currently, Brazil has been a democracy for the longest period in its history. According to 
Power (2010), the regime has achieved positive policy changes from social welfare to 
global activism. It has also been able to bypass certain failures that plagued its neighbor 
such as financial default, populism, secessionism, and unconstitutional succession. 
Nonetheless, the regime faces challenges ahead, especially in terms of a fractured 
political system and high corruption, and will need to continue working towards an 
efficient democratic system.  
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The following paragraphs will present a short case study of Brazil during the 
military rule from 1964 to 1975 examining the theoretical framework established earlier. 
The main concentration will be on constraints (selectorate theory) and rule of law.   
After eighteen years of democratic rule, with several presidential interruptions or 
breakdowns, the military intervened via a coup during what was a very turbulent period. 
And Castelo Blanco (one of the officers) became the president. The coup came amidst 
increasing sociopolitical polarization, populism, electoral fraud, volatile growth, 
recurring inflation and fear of communism (Hagopian & Mainwaring, 1987). Looking at 
the economic developments during the 25 years of military rule, it is stunning to note that 
Brazil was able to achieve very impressive economic growth, especially during the 
“miracle” period of 1968-1973 where growth was in the double-digits, and 7% on 
average generally during the 1970’s (Power, 2016).  The economic policy increased per 
capita incomes, and while income inequality did also increase and the economic standing 
of the rich improved more rapidly than that of lower income individuals, the economic 
achievements benefited all improving welfare of the majority of Brazilians. Admittedly, 
civil liberties and political rights were stifled, and the population was exposed to 
repression by the government (Power, 2016). But the administration greatly improved 
taxation, created the National Monetary Council to coordinate monetary and fiscal policy, 
and established the Central Bank in 1965 (Alston, Melo, Mueller, & Pereira, 2016). 
Looking at the situation in a relative manner, the abuses endured were much lower in 
Brazil than under some of the neighboring regimes (Power, 2016). These developments 
can be attributed to several things. The onset of military rule was coupled with a retention 
of many institutions from the democratic regime such as parties, elections for 
municipalities and the legislature, and the Congress. Also, the military regime in Brazil 
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did not revolve around an individual, a personalistic leader. Rather, it was centered 
around an institutionalized junta which had a certain level of alternation of power among 
the factions of the military (Alston et al., 2016). In fact, the junta was comprised of four 
factions: the soft-liners, hard-liners, developmentalists and the techno-bureaucrats. The 
most moderate and economically liberal were the soft-liners. They acted as a 
counterbalance to the others, especially hard-liners who often preferred a more repressive 
and efficient governance. The former also supported a speedy return to democracy (Alson 
et al., 2016).  
It could be argued that the military junta represented the selectorate as it 
constituted the politically influential group on whose support the president depended. 
That is, while Congress formally elected the president, it was only after one had been 
suggested by the top military officers (Bates, 2010). The diversity of stances just across 
the factions meant that policy-making would not be easily manipulated nor reforms 
unilaterally made. It is the diversity within the selectorate that produces better leadership 
and policy making (Hanson et al., 2012). This assertion can be illustrated by looking at 
the chief executive position. While Branco did initially enjoy the period of good 
economic performance, the stabilization of the economy was a process, and it brought 
about a slowdown in industrial production. Realizing that it would take longer to stabilize 
the economy and feeling pressure, Branco saw the solution in extending his own term. 
This cost him the support of the conservative politicians and noteworthy governors. 
Resultantly, while Branco wanted to get re-elected, the junta did not comply mostly due 
to the hardliners and the developmentalists (Alson et al., 2016). Instead, they chose Costa 
e Silva to serve as the new president in 1967.   
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Likewise, when in August 1968 Silva suffered a stroke, even though the vice-
president was stipulated by the Constitution to succeed in case of a president’s 
incapacitation, the military disagreed. They did not want the vice president to take office 
and, instead, chose General Emilio Medici to be the new president as he was better able 
to offer the stability the armed forces needed at the time. Hence, in both cases, the 
military intervened to correct what it perceived as a less than optimal outcome. Branco 
was replaced due to his poor performance, and Medici was chosen over the vice-president 
because he offered more stability. In accordance with the theoretical framework 
presented before, the selectorate was able to modify the outcome based on its perception 
and preferences and act as a constraint on the executive power.  
Another important thing to note is the performance of the legal system. As 
indicated earlier, courts play an important, though different, role in democratic and non-
democratic settings (Gandhi, 2007a). While courts are often seen as being completely 
repressed and coopted in authoritarian settings, that need not be the case. In contrast to 
the Argentinian experience, where judges tended to sympathize with the military regime 
and rule in its favor, the Brazilian courts used their position to undermine the military 
rule when deemed just. Additionally, the courts wanted to initiate a dialogue with a 
broader segments of opinion, such as in the Congress, which shared its skepticism of the 
new regime (Osiel, 1995). With recurrent resistance displayed by the Court to certain 
military policies, realizing that the judiciary was not to be relied on, the junta responded 
(Ballard, 1999). On one hand, provisions and decrees were rewritten in broader terms so 
as to aid the judiciary in casting the right decision the next time. On the other hand, the 
hard-liners moved their repressive activity further underground and out of the reach of 
the court (Osiel, 1995). While its resistance was more tolerated when soft-liners had 
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better bearings, once the power balance tilted towards the hard-liners, the Courts became 
the recipient of more repressive measures. However, as a compromise between the 
different factions of the junta, the jurisdiction was passed over to the military tribunal that 
allowed the military corps to place the national security crime within their authority. Yet, 
the officers staffing these tribunals were the liberal or soft-line officers. It was with the 
appointment of General Ernesto Geisel as the new president that the pressure on the 
judiciary started to loosen. Shortly, he reinstituted judicial independence and reinstated 
individuals purged by the hard-liners (Ballard, 1999). Hence, while it would be false to 
argue that the Brazilian judicial system enjoyed all the liberties and safeguards it could 
phantom, it was able to exert some restraint. 
 
4.3.2 China  
During Mao’s rule of China, the country was beset by economic problems resulting from 
inefficient policies, mismanagement, and isolation (Morrison, 2013). Until 1973, China 
shaped its economy according to the Soviet model of planned economy. The government 
tried to speed up industrialization by investing in heavy industries. The dependency of 
growth on capital accumulation proved unsustainable and had negative welfare 
consequences. The ambitious industrialization attempts of the Great Leap Forward years 
damaged the agricultural production and contributed to the famine of 1959-96. Even 
though the agricultural production consisted of more than 70% of China’s labor force by 
the 1970s, the sector was not capable of providing its population with the minimum 
calorie intake (Zhu, 2012). While other sectors fared better, Chinese state-owned 
enterprises were inefficient and often created an oversupply of goods and services 
(Chow, 2004).   
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Following Mao’s death, however, the economy underwent a profound 
transformation. As a result, the economic performance of the next couple of decades 
continued to draw amazement worldwide, earning the title of Chinese Miracle. The 
average GDP growth rate during the 1952-1978 period was around 3%, which is 
surprising considering the economy was mismanaged with gross misallocation of 
resources, famines, and little improvement in overall welfare (Zhu, 2012). By contrast, 
the performance following this period, especially from 1982-2006, averaged 9% GDP 
growth per year. In less than two decades, Shanghai became a true metropolis with 
sophisticated and modern architecture. Efforts to combat poverty were more than 
impressive, with hundreds of millions of citizens lifted out of absolute poverty. Its 
accomplishments in such a short period are unmatched throughout history (Burton, 
2007). China has left isolation to become deeply immersed in the global economy. 
Despite its nondemocratic regime, it has become a major destination for foreign direct 
investment inflows–$70 US billion from 2004-2008 (Brandt et al., 2008, p.3).  
The question is how did an autocratic, single-party system achieve such strides. It 
can be argued that China developed constraints on the executive office and adopted the 
rule of law. As argued before, these factors have widely been accepted as essential 
conditions for development, and China has been able to improve significantly on the 
latter.  
Over its course of development since the end of Mao’s rule, China has been 
working towards increasing collective decision making at the central and local levels and 
institutionalizing the leadership selection procedure. The guiding idea has been the fear 
that overt concentration of power would facilitate the rise of arbitrary rule by individuals 
which would hamper the collective leadership and threaten its survival. As noted in 
 
 
64 
preceding paragraphs, formal institutions are able to solve coordination problems, 
enhance credibility, facilitate elite bargaining and enable further development. By 
achieving broader accountability, which solves commitment issues and reduces collective 
action issues within the party, the leadership can experience higher stability to weather 
periods of substantial change (World Bank, 2017).  Namely, ruling party industrialization 
gives assurance to members of the ruling coalition that in case of breaches by the ruler, 
that collective action can be undertaken easily and they will be able to punish the 
arbitrary actions (Gelbach, 2008). In contrast to the preceding period, the Chinese 
Communist Party ceased to be dominated by charismatic leaders with the power to 
choose their own successors. Instead, substantial changes were put in place in order to 
institutionalize not only the succession of leadership but use of power as well. 
Accordingly, a two-line leadership succession system was installed where the leader 
occupies three roles—as the head of state, the military and the party—but can only do so 
for a limited period of two 5-year terms set by the constitution. Simultaneously, a vice 
president is designated and comes among the political elite.  The role of such 
appointment of the successor is important because it reduces conflict between the elites in 
terms of vying for the position, and allows the vice president to gain experience and 
legitimacy. Lastly, the Politburo Standing Committee expanded to consist of nine 
members selected from the Politburo as candidates and to be approved by the 370 
members of the Central Committee (Forde, 2011). The change in the regulation of 
political leadership has been important for ensuring that certain constraints exist on the 
Chief Executive, as failures on his behalf threaten the stability of the regime.   
During Deng’s rule, the decentralized structure of the political system allowed for 
the provincial officials to play the role of a counterweight to the conservative central 
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authority. The incentive for good governance came from the system where successes in 
provincial income and employment improvements is rewarded. Thus, by attracting 
investments, the provincial leadership is able to acquire incentive bonuses. While 
defaulting by the government is possible, it is not likely as the institutionalization of the 
party and the independence of the provincial regions allows for collective actions on the 
part of the local cadres. This would not be in the interest of the leadership.  This center-
province mechanism provides credibility and provides assurances to investors as good 
performance is stimulated by bonuses (Gelbach, 2008). The empowerment of provinces 
and their elites have contributed to changes in the composition of the Central Committee 
selectorate (Hanson et al., 2012).  
An illustration of the role of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party would 
be the situation that developed between Hua Guofeng and Deng Xioaping. Explicitly, 
throughout his presence in the party, Hua followed a strict policy of executing whatever 
decision Mao had made (Narayanan, 2006). He was designated as Mao’s successor and 
was supposed to lead the Party. However, his orientation towards maintaining Mao’s 
ideology did not bode well with the new current of thinking of the Chinese Communist 
Party leadership. Hence, his supporters were quickly replaced with Deng’s and his power 
quickly eroded. Thereafter, Deng fulfilled his role, though he never officially assumed it 
(Bates, 2010). In a similar light, the next General Secretary, who was Deng’s successor, 
resigned before the end of his term. The underlying cause had been the dissatisfaction of 
the of members of the Politburo with his tolerant approach towards pro-democracy 
protests by students.  Lastly, Jiang Zemin was handed power from Deng in 1989. He was 
able to fulfill his first term and was formally re-elected by the Central Committee, 
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reflecting the satisfactory performance he achieved in the eyes of the Chinese Communist 
Party membership (Bates, 2010). 
 In addition, the policies of cadre recruitment had changed and contributed to 
constraining overt concentration of power. In particular, the educational and professional 
criteria were increased and a retirement age was introduced. As a result, many 
uneducated and older officials were retired. Almost 90% of the leadership of 1998 had 
been elected since 1982. More importantly, 60% of them were holders of college degrees 
(World Bank, 2017).  
The selectorate has become more diverse by allowing for greater participation of 
the private sector in the decision-making process. Namely, entrepreneurial elites and 
local officials have been increasingly present within the decision making bodies, such as 
the Central Committee. By incorporating elites with different preferences in terms of 
economic policies, the economy itself was changed (Hanson et al., 2012). The 
deliberative process of the party has extended outside the party as the party officials with 
individuals and groups who do not belong to the party. Rather than a façade, these 
deliberations have been found to have often led to policy revisions. However, issues 
relating to core political issues or party survival are kept within the party.  Finally, the 
Chinese Communist Party has been successful in incorporating the business class into the 
regime (Dickson, 2003). 
Thus, it can be seen that, while a single party regime, since 1973 China has been 
following institutionalization efforts, and can be viewed as having a mechanism capable 
of maintaining efficient governance. While the constraints it faces are not as robust as 
those of democracies, its success attests to its ability to offer guarantees necessary for a 
functioning socio-economic environment.    
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Following the death of Mao, the new Chinese leadership has been oriented 
towards establishing a reliable legal system. By placing constraints on individual power, 
the rule of law would allow disasters like the Chinese Revolution to be avoided in the 
future. Most of the substantial reforms began in the 1990s, corresponding to the 
strengthening of market reforms. It cannot be denied that the three decades of legal 
reforms have brought about an increasingly important role for the law in Chinese society 
(Ling, 2014). However, it is important to acknowledge the fact that China had never 
experienced a western legal system before it adopted a socialist legal approach during the 
beginning of Communism. Thus, its relationship with law has been based on a mixture of 
Chinese history, tradition, Confucianism and administrative experience. Not only that, 
but, what form of legal system it had was destroyed by the Cultural Revolution 
(Castelluci, 2007). Despite this experience, the emerging legal institutions of China have 
been working on satisfying the expected role the legal system should have in terms of 
economic transactions, citizen-state disputes and legal rights promotion (Ling, 2014).  
The goal of developing a legal system became part of the Constitution in 1999. 
More than 200 laws had been created, modified and enforced. Its law-related structures 
have shown more assertiveness in pursuing legal improvements. The lawyers, legal 
scholars, and media have been engaging in promoting reforms, providing protection and 
reporting on controversial cases. The Chinese Communist Party has allowed a degree of 
political space for individuals and organizations to occupy in efforts to develop the law 
(Horsley, 2008).  Studies have shown that system-based trust has been relatively high 
(Inglehart, 1997). Courts are held in high regard. Interestingly, the Chinese Communist 
Party has been diligent in promoting legal awareness within the institutions. The law is 
being incorporated into school curriculum and party cadres are required to attend courses 
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at different levels. There have also been efforts in exporting legal reforms to rural areas 
(Wu et al., 2009). In 1996 and 2004 laws had been passed that aimed to rein in 
government action itself by placing procedural constraints. These laws have laid out bare 
standards of fairness that need to be provided by officials. For example, a legal suit 
against the Ministry of Information Industry was won by a private company when 
brought before the court on accusation of unfair treatment under the Licensing Law 
(Horsley, 2006, pp.4-5). Finally, the Rule of Law Index Report of 2011 shows that China 
demonstrates a relatively evenly distributed rule of law. It highlights that China has 
achieved great improvements in terms of the “quality, effectiveness, and accountability of 
its legal institutions” (World Justice Project, 2011, p.28). Its ranking is 25th in security 
and 2nd in criminal justice system among the countries within its income category. It also 
has a civil court system that is relatively accessible and fast. However, it needs 
improvements in enforcement of regulation and fundamental rights in terms of labor, 
assembly and speech (WJP, 2011). Thus, it can be said that the rule of law has achieved 
major strides towards having a desirable level of substance but there is much room for 
improvement. Nevertheless, the general portrayal of China as a country lacking any legal 
system or accountability are greatly skewed and do not reflect the recent efforts presented 
by the political system.    
In conclusion, the dichotomous distinction between democracies and non-
democracies obscures important details that hinder a coherent analysis of the relationship 
between development and regime types. This chapter aimed to investigate the ability of 
different regime types to implement policies that can bring about development by 
synthesized an array of different theoretical works. It was found that all political regime 
types are capable of delivering good economic performance by utilizing different 
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mechanisms and institutions. Thus, as hypothesized, it demonstrated that political regime 
types per se are not expected to be good indicators of development. Rather, the presence 
of specific factors such as rule of law, constraints on the executive, long time horizons 
(durability), and economic freedoms are expected to be more capable of influencing the 
development of a country.     
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5 Empirical Analysis 
 
The assumptions and hypothesis formulated in the previous chapter will be analyzed and 
tested in this chapter using panel data—a combination of cross-sectional and time-series 
data. Firstly, a description of the dataset will be given in 5.1, of the dependent variable in 
5.2, the independent variables in 5.3, and the control variables in 5.4. This will be 
followed by a layout of the models used in 5.5 and hypotheses in 5.6. Finally, the results 
are presented in 5.7 and discussed in 5.8 
 
5.1     The Dataset 
The data were collected from 96 countries, observed over a 25-year period in a 5-year 
interval from 1995 to 2015. Thus every county is observed a total of five times. Initially 
the study intended to cover the period from 1980 to 2015 and include a wider set of 
countries, but this was unfeasible due to missing data and differences in reporting. 
Moreover, in order to maintain an adequate number of observations, the dataset had to be 
corrected in few occasions. Namely, some of the datasets used to create the current 
dataset had data with years missing at the 5-year interval points, but available in years 
preceding or following the interval year. In these cases, if available, the study took the 
following and preceding year and averaged them to replace the missing interval value. 
However, in other cases, if either the preceding or following variable were missing, only 
the one observation available was used. Likewise, data points as far as 3 years forward or 
back were used to replace values, and whenever averaging was available, the study used 
the average of the two to make the approximation more accurate. While a period of three 
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years does allow for some changes to begin unfolding, the use of the three-year interim 
was minimal, and therefore, the dataset should not have any serious problems with the 
predictability and reliability of the data.  
 
5.2  The Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is a country’s Human Development Index(HDI) in a given year. 
Human development concept is defined by the United Nations Development Program as 
a process that, rather than being centered around improving individual’s incomes, 
maximizes “human choices—by enhancing human rights, freedoms, capabilities and 
opportunities” (Human Development Report, 2015, p.1). Development is a process that, 
at a minimum, enables individuals to access education, improve their living conditions, 
and live long and healthy lives. By being allowed to form their own choice, unrestricted 
by poverty, inequality, gender or race, individuals are able to achieve their maximum 
potentials unburdened by outside restrictions. The emphasis on economic development is 
crucial for a country’s future trajectory as improvements in income alone do not translate 
into improved standards of living for individuals. But, with a great percentage of the 
population barred from economic activity by poverty and lack of mobility, the economy 
cannot progress. Consequently, larger disparities in income levels between individuals 
lead to larger levels of income inequality within a country. With increased inequality 
there are higher disparities and lower opportunities feeding into an unvirtuous cycle of 
socio-economic stagnation. The findings in this section will thus have important 
implications for developing countries. 
As human development is a multifaceted process, devising a measure that is 
capable of capturing all of the dimensions that shape and determine an individual’s life 
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outcomes is all but impossible; many different indices have been proposed. The United 
Nations has developed a three-component index of human development meant to capture 
improvements in education, health and personal income. It is a weighted index of: (i) life 
expectancy at birth, (ii) education measured in terms of the mean number of years of 
schooling for a resident of the country and the expected years of schooling, and (iii) gross 
national income per capita. While the original index ranges from 0 to 1, for this study it is 
multiplied by a 100 in order to convert it into the 0 to 100 range. 
This index has been extensively used in different studies because it is a more 
adept and consistent measure of welfare than national wealth indices. In addition, it is 
offered by an intergovernmental organization capable of financing continuous studies 
allowing it compensate for the lack or incompleteness of national data from many 
countries.  
 
5.3     Independent variables 
In this study, the sets of independent variables have been collected from the Polity IV 
dataset, the Good Governance dataset and the Economic Freedom dataset. These are 
presented bellow.   
 
5.3.1 Polity IV  
The Polity IV consistent of seven variables of political institutions meant to estimate the 
constraints on the executive power as well as the nature of succession of power. The first 
variable captures the extent to which the Chief Executive position is regulated, where 
regulation refers to the extent to which a political regime has institutionalized processes 
for transferring the executive power. It is a discreet variable with range from 1 to 3 and 
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with a mean of 2.68 (see Appendix tables 2A and 3A). Of the 480 observations, 2.08% of 
countries in the dataset have a value of 1, meaning that they are characterized by 
unregulated Chief Executive recruitment where power is transferred through forceful 
means. Some examples of countries that belong to this category are Rwanda in 1995 and 
2000, Gambia in 1995 and Pakistan in 2000. On the other hand, 63.96% of the countries 
observed, specifically have a regulated Chief Executive recruitment, meaning that there 
are procedures through which power is transferred (i.e., hereditary succession or 
competitive elections). The United States, Switzerland, Portugal, South Africa, Mauritius 
and Jordan are good examples of regulated Chief Executive recruitment. Finally, the 
value of 2 serves as an intermediate category for those countries for which the Chief 
Executive recruitment cannot be clearly discerned or is at a point of transition from 
unregulated to regulated. Some of the intermediate countries are Russia, Thailand, 
Romania, Tunisia and Sri Lanka.  
The second variable measures the extent to which the executive recruitment is 
competitive. Here, competitive denotes the degree to which the principal methods of 
progression grant equal opportunities to subordinates to become super-ordinates. The 
mean is 2.3. The data is also discreet with a range from 1 to 3, but the value of 0 is also 
given in certain cases25 (see Appendix tables 2A and 4A). The value of 1 is given to 
countries that have their Chief executive chosen by succession, designation or both (i.e., 
monarchies), which is 3.2% of observations. If a country has the Chief executives 
determined by competitive elections, then it is assigned a value of 3. Some of the 
countries with competitive elections are Greece, France, Finland, Malaysia (2010, 2015), 
Japan, Nicaragua and Jamaica. Of the 480 observations, 61.04% has competitive 
elections. Finally, the value 2 represents the intermediate category for transitioning cases 
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such as Romania (1995), Botswana (1995-205), Ethiopia (1995, 2000), Turkey (2015) 
and Venezuela (2015). 
The next variable is the Openness of the Executive Recruitment. Openness refers 
to the extent to which those citizens that are politically active are given the opportunity to 
attain the position of the Chief Executive via the institutionalized process. The data is 
discreet, ranging from 1 to 4, with a mean of 3.58 (see Appendix tables 2A and 5A). 
However, the value of 0 is also possible in specific conditions26. The value 1 is given to 
those countries where the succession is based on the right of descent. In the data, none of 
the countries fulfill this criteria, hence there are 0 observations for the value of 1. The 
value of 2 is given when there is hereditary succession together with court selection of 
the chief minister. Such cases would be Jordan, Morocco and Nepal (only 2005) and 
represent 2.29% of the data. Countries with hereditary succession together with electoral 
selection of the chief minister are given 3, and they represent 0.62% of the cases. These 
countries are Iran (2000) and Nepal (1995, 2000). Finally, the value of 4 is given to 
countries where elite designation or competitive elections are used to determine the 
Executive position (outsiders can access the position).  This happens to be the case in 
most of the countries, specifically 87.92% of the dataset. Hence, examples range from 
Angola, Brazil, Costa Rica to China, Russia, Belgium and the United States.27    
The four variables described above are combined into a single concept-variable 
named Executive Recruitment.  As its components, the variable is discreet, ranges from 1 
to 8, and has a mean of 6.84 (see Appendix tables 2A, 6A and 10A). This concept 
variable is simply an alternative measure of authority patterns. Due to its ability to 
capture the effect of the interaction between variables, Executive Recruitment was chosen 
as one of the main independent variables of interest. For the purposes of this research, it 
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was converted into a binary variable to capture the effects of substantial transitions. 
Extensive descriptions of the coding scheme here would be redundant, as it is based on 
the coding of the aforementioned variables. Rather, for detailed explanation of the coding 
scheme, refer to Table 6 in the appendix. It will only be noted that higher values are 
assigned to countries where Executive Recruitment is open, regulated and determined 
through competitive elections. In order to dichotomize the differences between polities, 
binary variable was assigned 1 when the values of the Executive Recruitment variable 
were higher or equal to 6; otherwise, it was coded as 0.  Because of this, transitions from 
highly unregulated and restricted procedures to slightly less restrictive ones will not be 
given the same weight that a transition from unregulated to regulated and institutionalized 
procedures gains. From the 480 observations, 107 were grouped under 0 while 373 were 
grouped under 1.  Some of the countries that would be grouped under value of 1 are the 
United States, Columbia, Costa Rica, Ethiopia (1995, 2000), Finland, Honduras, Norway, 
Romania, Russia and Zimbabwe (2010, 2015). On the other hand, some of the countries 
belonging to the category under 0 are Algeria, China, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Syria.  
The second main independent variable is the constraints on the Chief Executive. 
The term constraints refer to the extent to which limits on the decision-making powers of 
the executive office exist and are institutionalized. The shape of the limits varies across 
settings. In democracies, this will tend to be the legislature. In other regimes, it might be 
councils of nobles, members of the ruling party in a single-party state, advisors in 
monarchies, the military apparatus (e.g. Latin America), and so forth (see Appendix table 
8A for details). The stress is on an existence of a check and balance type of system, 
regardless whether it is between a legislature and a president, or the Chairman and the 
Politburo. This variable correlates well with the idea of a “selectorate” (not necessarily all 
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the premises of the theory). The variable is discreet, ranging from 0 to 7, with a mean of 
5.43 (see Appendix tables 2A, 7A, and 11A). The value of 1 is given to those countries 
where there are no regular limitations on the Executive powers; the authority of the 
executive is unlimited. Some of the countries that have executives with unlimited 
authority are Gambia (1995), Pakistan (2000), Syria (1995, 2015), Republic of Congo 
(2000), and Nepal (2005). On the other hand, countries with strong constraints on the 
executive have a value of 7. Some of these are India, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Lesotho, and 
Uruguay. This variable was also converted into a binary variable, where a value of 1 is 
given whenever Executive constraints were greater or equal to 5. Those countries that had 
strong constraints on the Executive made up 41.25% out of 480 observations.  Some of 
these are Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela (1995), Tunisia (2015), Trinidad and Tobago, 
South Africa, Senegal (2000, 2005), and Pakistan (1995, 2010, 2015).  
The last two variables are used to make assessments of political participation. 
Participation refers to the degree to which non-elites are capable of influencing political 
elites (see Appendix table 9A). The first variable captures the regulation of participation. 
The variable is discreet, ranging from to 5, with a mean of 3.23 (see Appendix tables 2A, 
8A and 2A). The value of 1 is given to countries that had unregulated political 
participation (0.83% of observations). An example would be Papua New Guinea. The 
value of 5 is given to countries with regulated political participation with stable and 
lasting political groups (28.54% of observations). Some of the examples of these are the 
United States, Sweden, Switzerland, Panama, Mauritius, Japan, Costa Rica, and Hungary.  
The second variable is the competiveness of participation, where competiveness 
means that alternative policies can be forwarded in the political environment. The 
variable is discreet, ranging from 1 to 5, with a mean of 3.7 (see Appendix tables 2A and 
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8Ab). A value of 0 is given to cases coded as unregulated under the previous variable. 
The value of 1 is given to countries that repress any political activity outside of 
government ranks (2.71% of observations). Some of these countries are China, Syria, 
Rwanda (995), and Gambia (995). On the other hand, a value of 5 is given to countries 
that have regular and stable competition between political groups (28.54% of 
observations). Countries that fulfill this description are United States, Uruguay, Portugal, 
Spain, Poland, Costa Rica, Mauritius, and Japan. 
 The two variables described above are combined into a single concept-variable 
named Political Competition (see Appendix tables 2A, 9A and 13A). The variable is 
discreet, ranges from 1 to 10, and has a mean of 6.84. The detailed coding scheme is 
available in the Appendix table 10A. Countries given a score poorly on political 
competition (2.71% of observations). Those countries with a value of 0 had political 
participation that was organized and competitive (28.54% of observations).  This variable 
was also converted into a binary variable for the same purposes as outlined before. Thus, 
the value of 1 was given whenever the concept variable was equal to or greater than 7. As 
a result, countries group under 1 made up 73.75% of the data whilst those given a 0 made 
up 26.25% of the data.  
The aforementioned component coding is used to create an 11-point democracy 
indicator. The Polity IV project defines democracy in terms of: (1) competitiveness of 
political participation, (2) openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and (3) 
constraints on the executive office. Institutionalized autocracy is also a 11-point scale 
variable and is determined in terms of the same elements as democracy. For further 
details on coding see Appendix tables 4A and 5A. However, these variables are 
combined into a single score to allow more freedom in using the dataset to test various 
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questions. This is done by subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy score to 
create the Combined Polity Score (Polity2). The values ranges from -10 to +10, the 
positive values indicated a system that is closer to institutionalized democracy than 
autocracy. Polity2 is used to create binary variables for democratic, autocratic and hybrid 
regimes. The hybrid regime corresponds to both the idea of competitive electoral 
authoritarian regimes and competitive authoritarian regimes mentioned in chapter.28 As a 
result, the variable Democracy takes on a value of 1 whenever Polity2 score is strictly 
greater than 7. The variable Hybrid takes on a value of 1 whenever Polity2 is smaller or 
equal to 7 and greater or equal to 0. The variable Autocracy takes on a value of 1 
whenever the Polity2 score is strictly smaller than 0. Hence, some of the countries labeled 
as democracies are the United States, Turkey (1995), Switzerland, South Africa, India, 
Philippines, Japan, and Mexico (from 2000 onward). A few examples of hybrid regimes 
are Turkey (from 2000 onward), Russia, Peru (1995, 2000), Mozambique, Colombia, 
Ecuador (from 2000 onwards), and Tunisia (2005). Several countries labeled as 
autocracies are Syria, Morocco, Jordan, Gambia, and Egypt.  
Finally, the dataset also includes a variable ‘durability’ that indicates how long a 
regime has been in place; i.e., the number of years that passed since the last regime 
change. This variable is essential for attempting to discern the time horizon of a regime.  
 
5.3.2 World Bank: Good Governance 
Governance is the manner in which authority is exercised within a country. The concept 
of good governance revolves around the idea of the responsibility of the government and 
the governing bodies to meeting the needs of the masses rather than a small part of the 
population. It is often asserted that countries with good governance will perform better in 
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the socio-economic sphere (Abdellatif, 2003). The World Bank started the project 
“Worldwide Governance Indicators” in 1996 with the aim of assessing the quality of 
governance for countries around the world. The data was collected from (1) surveys of 
households and firms, (2) business information providers (Economist Intelligence Unit), 
(3) NGO’s, and (4) public sector organizations. There are six variables comprising this 
set, all of which capture perceptions on a specific matter and all of which range between -
2.5 and 2.5. Firstly, as corruption leads to misallocation, inefficiency, and predation, 
countries with competent governance have high control over corruption. Within this 
study, corruption is the perception of the extent to which power is pursued for selfish 
gains and the governing apparatus a servant of elite interests. The variable has a mean of 
-0.0033. Some of the countries with relatively lower levels of corruption are Belgium, 
Austria, United States, Japan, and Portugal. On the other hand, some of the countries that 
do not have a good control of corruption are Uganda, Syria, Venezuela, and Russia. 
Secondly, the voice and accountability variable captures the perception of the extent to 
which civil liberties are provided. The mean is 0.08. A few examples of countries with 
voice and accountability are Japan, Norway, Italy, Ireland, Costa Rica, and South Africa. 
In contrast, Zimbabwe, Egypt, Algeria, China, and Russia have a stifled or lacking voice 
and accountability. Thirdly, regulatory quality captures the perceptions of the capability 
of the government to implement sound policies and regulations essential for private 
sector growth (e.g. tariffs, price controls and ease of starting a business). The mean is 
0.89. Countries with high regulatory quality are Austria, Belgium, Malaysia, Cyprus, 
United States, and Botswana. On the other hand, countries with low regu Zimbabwe, 
Venezuela (2005, 2010, 2015), Iran, Ethiopia, and Argentina (2005, 2010, 2015). 
Fourthly, the World Bank describes the rule of law variable as the perception of the 
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confidence agents have in the rules of the society, as well as how much they abide by 
them, especially in the case of contract enforcement, property rights, courts, and 
protection from crime and violence. It collects its data from a number of sources, from 
the Economics Intelligence Unit, Global Competitiveness Report, Gallup World Poll to 
Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide (for other details on the 
methodology see Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, 20). The mean value is 0.983. Some of 
the countries with effective rule of law are Finland, France, Denmark, Jordan, Malaysia, 
Mauritius, Thailand (1995, 2000, 2005) and Morocco (1995, 2000). Fifthly, Political 
Stability and Absence of Violence captures the perception of the extent to which there is 
no severe political instability and politically motivated violence, like terrorism or violent 
rebellion. The mean of the variable is 0.898. Some of the countries with higher levels of 
political stability and absence of violence are the United States, Switzerland, Spain, Costa 
Rica, Czech Republic, Mauritius, South Africa and Guyana (2000).  On the other hand, 
Algeria, Cameroon, China, Egypt and Pakistan have lower political stability and absence 
of violence. Lastly, Government Effectiveness captures the perception of the adequacy of 
public service provision, independence from pressure, quality of policy-making, 
credibility of government commitments to its policies and quality of civil service. The 
mean is 0.068. The examples of countries with effective governments are Switzerland, 
Sweden, United States, Malaysia, Tunisia (2000), and Hungary.   
 
5.3.3 Economic Freedom Index 
The Economic Freedom Index was created in 1995 by the Heritage Foundation in a 
collaboration with the Wall Street Journal. As it is available annually, it allows for the 
analysis of regional, national and global trends in relatively short time periods. The index 
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is calculated through a weighted average of individual values assigned for 10 different 
aspects of economic freedom. The final scores range from 0 to 100. Hence, a country that 
scored the maximum value of 100 would be associated with policies that make the 
environment most conductive to economic freedoms.    
Firstly, trade freedom ranges from 0 to 100. It has a mean of 68. Out of the 480 
observations, 1.25% are in 0-20 range, 4.79% are in 20-40 range, 17.50% are in the 40-60 
range, 52.08% are in the 60-80 percent and 24.38% are in the 80-100 range. However, no 
country has a trade freedom index of 90 or higher. This variable measures whether a 
country’s goods and services are fairly able to move freely across borders or whether 
restrictions, such as tariffs, customs, quotas, regulatory restrictions and so forth hinder 
trade. It forms an important condition for economic growth and development because it 
allows consumers to access cheaper goods and services, transfer of knowledge and 
technology, and improves the wealth of a country. Therefore, countries with open borders 
are assumed to have better conditions for sustainable economic and human development. 
However, it might be the case that countries at low levels of development will not be able 
to benefit from free trade as much as more developed countries, as they will be limited to 
the export of low-skilled goods while their markets will be flooded with more refined 
manufactured products, creating an imbalance and deficit in the balance of payment 
account. In general, openness to trade improves a country’s ability to prosper by 
stimulating competitiveness, efficiency and specialization in goods for which it has a 
comparative advantage reducing overall world deadweight loss (Mankiw, 2012). Some of 
the countries with high trade freedoms are the United States, Algeria (2010, 2015), 
Zambia, Turkey, Thailand, South Africa, and Russia (from 2005 onwards).  
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Secondly, investment freedom spans from 0 to 100. The mean of the variable is 
55. Out of the 480 observations, 4.17 are in 0-20 range, 16.25% in 20-40, 32.29% in 40-
60, 37.08% in 60-80 and 10.21% in 80-100. Investment freedom measures whether there 
are constraints on the flow of investment capital in and out of a country. More than ever 
before, countries in the globalized era are greatly aided by foreign direct investment and 
the high liquidity of resources that allows financial capital to be quickly transferred 
between countries to the allocation of higher efficiency. Consequently, investments will 
tend to be diverted from countries that put constraints or restrictions on the flow of 
financial capital as it erodes economic efficiency and hinders the performance of firms. 
Moreover, it creates a higher risk environment for potential investors and restrains firms 
from engaging in capital expansion. Hence, countries with higher degrees of investment 
freedom should have better economic outlooks that others, lower unemployment, and 
higher human development than others. A few countries with higher levels of investment 
freedom are the United States, Russia (1995), Peru, Morocco, Jordan, Honduras (2010, 
2015), and Finland.    
Thirdly, financial freedom spans from 0 to 100 and has a mean of 51. Of 480 
observations, 3.75% is in the 0-20 range, 20.83% in 20-40, 36.88% in 40-60, 30% in 60-
80 and 8.54% in 80-100. The financial freedom variable captures whether the banking 
system is efficient and independent from the interference and control by the country’s 
political apparatus. Namely, in order to protect the monetary system from being overtly 
affected by changes in the political sphere, especially to protect it from abuse by 
politicians seeking re-elections, the monetary system needs to have a mechanism that 
shields it from these adverse effects. In certain countries, the banking system is separated 
from the political control of the executive and given full independence of action. This 
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ensures that policies are pursued due to their potential economic merit rather than 
political motives. It also allows for the final economic decisions to be made by experts in 
the field without the interference of the political bureaucracy. Countries with this 
separation are then abler to implement less popular policies that are needed at time of 
economic turmoil as the members of the monetary body are not dependent on elections 
by the people. Consequently, this might also grant a layer of stability as adverse reactions 
by the population become less fruitful.  A country need not have a completely 
independent monetary body in order to enjoy the same benefits, as partial influence from 
the executive can be beneficial when quicker policy actions need to be taken. It can be 
expected that countries with greater financial freedom will be better able to achieve 
innovation, technological advancement, and development. Some of the countries with 
high financial freedoms are Austria, Belgium, Zambia (1995, 2000), Uganda (2005, 
2010), Thailand (2010, 2015), Morocco (2010, 2015), Jordan and Italy.  
Fourthly, property rights spans from 0-100 and has a mean of 49. Of 480 
observations, 6.25% are in the 0-20 and 32.92% in 20-40, 30.83% in 40-60, 15.83% in 
60-80 and 14.17% in 80-100. It captures the extent to which private property is protected 
by law as well as the extent to which the law is enforced, hence capturing the ability of 
the population to accrue private property. The importance of property rights for an 
economy is undisputable. As presented in Chapters 3 and 4, property rights give 
confidence to consumers and investors to engage in economic activity. They allow 
individuals to accrue property and material possessions important for affording good 
standards of living. Property rights relative to other countries have given Britain the 
advantage needed for the onset of industrial revolution. Property rights are part of the rule 
of law, and rule of law is arguably an essential condition for development (Angeles, 
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2011; Domingo, 2009). Some of the countries that rank high on the protection of property 
rights are the United States, Morocco (2000), Jordan (1995, 2000, 2015), Botswana, 
France, and Gambia (1995).  
Fifthly, freedom from corruption spans from 0-100 and has a mean of 41. Of the 
480 observations, 12.92% in 0-20 range, 46.25% in 20-40, 21.46% in 40-60, 9.79% in 
60-80 and 9.58 in 80-100 range. This variable captures the extent to which the economy 
is able to function without inefficiency and waste spurred by corruption. Namely, 
corruption causes the quality of services to decrease as quality becomes a service 
afforded only to those that are able to provide the enticement. Corruption means public 
resources are exploited by officials, financial resources are wasted on private benefits, 
public goods like education and healthcare are denied to larger amounts of the 
population, property rights are threatened, and lowers investment due to uncertainty it 
creates. Yet, some authors have argued that corruption can be beneficial in weak 
institutional settings with poor performance (Meon and Weill 2010, Acemoglu and 
Verdier 2000). For example, in cases where the inefficient bureaucratic process leads to 
damaging barriers to growth due to too long and complicated business procedures 
creating an adverse environment for innovation and corporate interests.  However, in both 
cases, higher amounts of corruption will inevitably cripple the economy, retard growth, 
and lower investments.  
Sixthly, fiscal freedom spans 0 to 100 and has a mean of 70. Of the 480 
observations, 0.21% is in 0-20, 2.92% in 20-40, 18.12% in 40-60, 50.62% in 60-80, 
28.12% in 80-100. Fiscal freedom measures the tax burden that citizens bear.  Namely, 
taxes tend to decrease personal consumption by individuals (income taxes) and firms 
(corporate taxes), as a part of their income is taken away by the government. 
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Subsequently, as consumers decrease their demand for products, the overall Gross 
Domestic Product tends to fall down as producers react to the shortage in demand by 
decreasing their production. Regardless, a higher tax burden will have adverse effects for 
growth (Mankiw, 2012). 
Seventhly, government spending ranges from 0-100 and has a mean value of 65. 
Out of the 480 observations, 7.71% are in the 0-20 range, 9.17% in 20-40, 15.42% from 
40-60, 34.79% from 60-80 and 32.92% from 80-100. It places a quantitative measure of 
the amount that government expenditures comprise as a percentage of the overall Gross 
Domestic Product. Government spending is very important for the provision of public 
goods whose non-excludable and non-rivalrous properties make their supply by private 
actors unprofitable and unlikely. The government is expected to, and gains approval by, 
using its revenue in order to invest into education, health care, social safety nets and so 
forth, all of which are essential for ensuring that standards of living are conductive to 
personal and professional growth. Some of the countries that have higher government 
spending are Albania (from 2000 onwards), Algeria (until 2010), United States (2000), 
Uruguay, Switzerland (2005, 2010, 2015), South Africa, Russia, Ireland (2000, 2005, 
2010) and Japan (1995, 2000, 2010). 
Eighthly, Business Freedom ranges from 0-100 and has a mean value of 65. Out 
of 480 observations, 0.21% are in 0-20, 2.71% in 20-40, 40.42% in 40-60, 39.58% in 60-
80 and 17.08% in 80-100. Simply put, it is a measure of the competitiveness of a 
country’s business environment. While procedures are important to guarantee an efficient 
and fair environment, there need to be mechanisms that facilitate business procedures so 
that growth-stimulating projects are not diverted from the country. Hence, in cases where 
it is relatively easy, where too many regulations do not substantially increase costs or 
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lead to a high misallocation of resource, and where the process of closing businesses is a 
simple matter, the economy will be able to achieve higher progress and better standards 
of living than in other places. Consequently, governments that are able to efficiently 
balance by providing enough protection for the consumers while allowing businesses to 
avoid time consuming and costly regulations that can be improved, will be able to 
perform better, attract more FDI, and allow for lower-income households to to improve 
standards of living by partaking in small enterprises. Some of the countries that have 
higher levels of business freedom are the United States, Turkey (2000, 2010, 2015), 
Tunisia, Thailand, Switzerland, Russia (1995, 2015), and Morocco. 
Lastly, monetary freedom spans from 0-100 and has a mean of 72. Of the 480 
observations, 2.71% are in the 0-20 range, 1.25% in 20-40, 6.67% in the 40-80, 59.38 in 
60-80 and 30% in 80-100.  It conveys the extent to which a price stability is pursued and 
achieved as well as the extent to which there are price controls that create distortions in 
the market. Namely, it captures whether or not there is overt government intervention in 
the currency valuation systems, impediment of market forces by intervention or poor 
reform policies and whether overt indebtedness occurs due to the overwhelming freedom 
and control governments have over monetary issues.  It can be clear that countries that 
allow for the economy to plunge into high inflation or hyperinflation will have enormous 
problems in executing their basic tasks of governance, but also will have rapidly 
increasing amounts of the population falling further into poverty. Some of the countries 
with higher monetary freedom are the United States, Uganda, Tunisia, Thailand, Spain, 
South Africa, Sweden and Russia (2005, 2010, 2015). On the other hands, a few 
examples of those with lower monetary freedoms are Venezuela, Poland (1995), Uruguay 
(1995), and Romania (1994, 2000). 
 
 
87 
 
5.4   Control Variables 
In order to account for other variables that might influence HDI, this study employs 
certain control variables that had been widely used in the literature when working on 
similar questions to the one of this study.    
  Firstly, in order to account for how population composition might influence 
economic development within a country, three variables had been included: (1) ethnic 
fractionalization, the probability that two randomly chosen individuals will not belong to 
the same ethnic group (ethnicity contains a combination of racial and language 
characteristics), (2) lingual fractionalization, the probability that two randomly chosen 
individuals do not share the same language, (3) religious fractionalization, the probability 
that two randomly chosen individuals will not come from the same religion. These have 
been included to control for the ability of heterogeneous societies to be more prone to 
instability and conflict, as individual beliefs clash, differences are emphasized and groups 
are formed in contrast to others rather than as as complimentary to one another.  
Secondly, regional characteristics can affect HDI and GDP as well. For instance, 
a country with higher instability can affect stability of surrounding countries or even have 
its violence spill over borders and engulfing its neighbors. Regions that are landlocked 
might be less prosperous due to the higher constraints associated with their participation 
in the global markets and trade. Seven regional dummy variables were created to control 
for differences can affect the predicted values as well as the error: (1) Middle East and 
North Africa, (2) Sub Saharan Africa, (3) Europe and Central Asia, (4) East Asia and the 
Pacific, (5) North America, (6) South Asia, and (7) Latina America and the Caribbean. 
These regional dummies correspond to the World Bank’s definition.    
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Thirdly, colonialization may continue to affect development, even hundreds of 
years after a country gained freedom from a colonizing force.  Moreover, the scope of the 
effects colonialization had on countries and their people is extensive. Simply put, 
colonialization destroyed native cultures and ways of life while imposing western values 
and beliefs. They also often created tensions between different ethnic, religious, or 
linguistic groups that later turned into conflict and destabilization (Hrituleac, 2011). 
However, it has been argued that in certain cases where the colonizers wanted to live in 
the places they occupied, they brought good institutions that replicated European ones. 
Hence, certain countries experienced institutions that created checks and balances, 
protection of private property and so forth (Acemoglu, 2012). Whether these events were 
beneficial for the people themselves will not be discussed here, but these events are 
important to note because they might still affect the developmental process of these 
countries. As aforementioned, colonies that had been ruled by the British were largely 
left with legacies of capitalism and law that made them more likely to follow the path of 
democratization. On the other hand, the French did not encourage constitutionalism or 
free markets, hence, making immediate pursuit of democracies end in more tyrannical 
outcomes. Hence, this study includes binary variables for the colonial past: (1) British 
colony, (2) French colony, (3) Spanish colony, (4) other colony, (5) never colonized.   
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5.5         Regression Models 
 
In order to allow different aspects of economic and political freedom to affect economic 
development, several regression models are employed. In the first set, the dependent 
variable is measured by a country’s human development index. For robustness, a second 
model is estimated where the dependent variable is (log) per capita GDP. Each group of 
regressions includes a group of control variables— Ethnic Fractionalization indicators, 
region dummies and colony dummies—but the important distinction across the 
regressions is the particular measures of economic and political freedom. The three 
regression models for HDI are:  
 
Model 1: HDI is a function of political regime type (Democracy, Hybrid, Autocracy 
[omitted]), financial freedom, foreign direct investment, rule of law (Good Governance 
Index) and control variables.   
 
Model 2: HDI is a function of political structure elements (political competition, 
executive recruitment, executive constraints), financial freedom, foreign direct 
investment, political stability and absence of violence (Good Governance Index) and 
control variables).   
 
Model 3: HDI is a function of economic freedom (investment freedom, property rights, 
business freedom, financial freedom, monetary freedom, government spending, trade 
freedom, fiscal freedom), foreign direct investment, and control variables.   
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When log per capita GDP serves as the dependent variable, regression models are 
adjusted slightly to more readily capture possible effects of economic freedom variables. 
In particular, the two regression models for GDP are: 
 
Model 1: (log) per capita GDP is a function of political structure elements (political 
competition, executive recruitment, executive constraints), gross capital formation, labor 
force, durability, political stability, voice and accountability, government spending, 
property rights, business freedom and control variables.  
 
Model 1: (log) per capita GDP is a function political regime type (Democracy, Hybrid, 
Autocracy [omitted]), gross capital formation, labor force, durability, political stability, 
voice and accountability, government spending, property rights, business freedom and 
control variables.  
 
 
5.6 Hypotheses 
The regression analysis will be used to test five hypotheses regarding the relationship 
between political/economic freedoms and economic development. In particular, the 
hypotheses are: 
 
Hypothesis 1. Political competition and executive recruitment will be positively related 
            to HDI and GDP per capita. 
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Hypothesis 2. Executive constraints (electorate) are an important predictor  
                       of human development and have a positive and highly  
                       significant correlation with HDI and GDP per capita.  
 
Hypothesis 3. Political regimes are less predictive of human development 
           and GDP per capita than specified sub-factors. 
         Hyp 3a. Good governance will lead to a higher human development  
                       (rule of law and government effectiveness). 
        Hyp 3b: The greater the durability of a country, the better able will it be to  
                      pursue development. Hence, durability should be positively correlated 
                      with HDI and GDP per capita. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Economic freedom is an important condition for achieving development. 
         Hyp 4a: Trade freedom, investment freedom, property rights, government spending  
                       and business freedom will be positively related to HDI and GDP per capita 
                       because they expand freedoms and opportunities for individuals. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Executive constraints and good governance should be significantly and   
                       positively related to the Economic Freedom Index, while political regime  
                       types should be of less important. 
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5.7        Empirical Results 
This section will present and interpret regression results so that the implication of the 
results can be discussed and analyzed in the following section (all of the models have 
been tested for multicolineraity, and the results fall within the acceptable range29). 
 
 
 
Table 1 (see page 119) shows the relationship between the Human Development 
Index and political regime types. As hypothesized, political regime types are not 
statistically significant on any levels. This may imply that political regime types are not 
as important as prediction of HDI. Similarly, foreign direct investment seems to also be a 
trivial factor in determining HDI.  On the other hand, the durability of a regime has a 
positive and statistically significant correlation with HDI (p-value<1%). According to 
model 1, a regime that continues for 10 years without a regime change would experience 
a 0.3 increase in the HDI, and a regime that continues for a 100 years would experience a 
3-point increase in the HDI. This would be the case with Canada, New Zealand, 
Switzerland and the United States, all of which have not experienced regime change in 
more than a 100 years. Likewise, the coefficient of the rule of law variable is highly 
statistically significant and positive.  If a country moves from a score of 0.51 (Costa Rica, 
1995) to a score of 1.51 (Belgium, 2015) or from 0.55(Thailand, 2000) to the score of 
1.53(United States, 2005), is expected to increase HDI by approximately 6.9.  
Due to the possibility that political regime type might prove statistically insignificant, a 
second model was run that replaced regime types with polity concept variables. The 
results show that political competition and constraints on the executive are statistically 
significant. Specifically, the political competition concept variable has a negative 
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coefficient (p-value<5%). When a country switches from having repressed and 
unregulated political competition to regulated and competitive political competition, HDI 
is expected to decreases by 3.92. This implies that if a country with a political 
competition environment such as that of China were to transition into a more open and 
inclusive political environment like that of Belgium, their HDI score would s expected to 
decrease by 3.92 points. On the other hand, constraints on the Chief executive variable is 
positive and statistically significant (p-value<1%). In particular, a transition from a 
situation where constraints on the Chief executive are lacking or weak to one with strong 
constraints on executive power would expect to result in a 6.76 increase in the HDI 
index. This would be equivalent to a transition from a country like Zambia to a country 
like Colombia or Austria. Financial freedom has a positive correlation with human 
development (p-value<0.1%). Namely, a 10-point increase of financial freedom, which 
would capture a transition from Uganda’s to Tunisia’s score, would be expected to result 
in a 1.02-point increase in the HDI. Likewise, political stability and absence of violence 
is positively related to human development (p-value<0.1%). A one-point increase in the 
political stability and absence of violence score is expected to lead to an increase in HDI 
by 4.38 points. Hence, a country that improves its political stability from Turkey ( -0.06 
in 2005) to Finland (1.63 in 2000), would be expected to see HDI increase by 4.38 points. 
The table 2 (see page 120) shows the relationship between HDI and the 
components of economic freedom. Firstly, investment freedom has a negative coefficient 
(p-value<5%). Thus, a 10-point increase in investment freedom is expected to lead to a 
1.04-point decrease in the HDI score; for example, Uganda (2015) would need 10 points 
to reach the United State’s score which would decrease its HDI by 0.99 points. Secondly, 
property rights are positively related to HDI (p-value<5%). If property rights score 
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increases by 10 points, the HDI score is expected to increases by 1.16. Hence, a country 
that improves its provision of property rights from those of India to those of Hungary will 
experience this increase in the HDI. Thirdly, business freedom is positive and highly 
significant (p-value<0.1%). When the business freedom score experiences a 10-point 
increase, HDI is expected to increase by 1.81 points. An example of this shift would be a 
transition from a Burkina Faso’s (2010) score of 60 in Burkina Faso to Netherlands 
(2005) score of 70. Fourthly, monetary freedom is also positively correlated with HDI (p-
value<5%). When a country improves its monetary freedom by 10 points, the HDI is 
expected to increase by 0.64 points. Fifthly, on the other hand, government spending is 
negatively correlated with HDI (p-value<5%). If the government spending increases by 
10 points, then HDI is expected to decrease by 0.56 points. Sixthly, trade freedom is 
positively correlated with the HDI (p-value<0.1%). Here, a 10-point increase is expected 
to see a 1.87-point increase in HDI.  Lastly, the variable fiscal freedom is insignificant. 
Hence, as hypothesized, property rights, business freedom, monetary freedom and trade 
freedom are significant and positively related to HDI. However, government spending 
and investment freedom, while significant, are negatively related to the HDI, and fiscal 
freedom and financial freedom are not significant at all, contradicting the hypotheses.  
Table 3 (see page 121) shows the relationship between GDP per capita (GDPpc) 
and the explanatory variables of interests. As Model 2 did not lead to significant changes, 
and since, as hypothesized, political regime types are not significantly correlated with 
growth, the following paragraph will focus strictly on results of the Model 1. Firstly, 
political competition is positively correlated with GDP (p-value<5%). Compared to a 
country with no political participation, the GDPpc of a country with competitive and 
regulated political participation is expected to decrease GDPpc by 37%, contradicting the 
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hypothesis. Secondly, executive recruitment is not significant. Thirdly, the concept 
variable constraints on Chief executive is statistically significant at a 0.05 alpha level. It 
is also positively related to GDPpc; a change from a situation of no restraints of the Chief 
Executive’s powers to a situation where his powers are substantially constrained is is 
expected to led to a 35% increase in the GDPpc. Lastly, durability of a political regime is 
a highly significant explanatory variable with a positive coefficient. Hence, when a state 
survives 10 years without a change to the regime the GDPpc is expected to increase by 
9%. It can be seen, therefore, that the hypothesis that executive constraints and durability 
will be positively related to GDPpc holds. However, hypothesized correlation when it 
comes to executive recruitment and political competition does not hold.   
.   
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5.8        Discussion of Results 
The existence of executive constraints is positively correlated with both the level 
of human development of a country and its GDP per capita. Moreover, the results show 
that the variable constraints on the executive is also highly significant. As theorized in 
Chapter 3, non-democratic regimes can also face many factors and mechanisms which, 
while not the same as in democracies, put pressure on the government to design prudent 
economic and welfare policies. Since governments of hybrid and autocratic regimes often 
lack the legitimacy that democracies invoke (especially where executive recruitment is 
hereditary or exclusive), they have to thread a much thinner ground Though autocratic 
regimes are able to command a much higher level of repressive power, they cannot rule a 
society without any support whatsoever. Especially where leaders have taken power 
without the electoral process, they must acquire an adequate level of legitimacy to avert 
opposition that could turn into rebellion. This can be accomplished by refraining from 
any extreme action that might undermine the Chief executive and the ruling body. On top 
of that, the regime also needs to be weary of outside attempts at the executive positions 
that would have the same effect of destabilizing the regime. Hence, even when 
authoritarian regimes do not face institutionalized constraints like those of democratically 
elected governments, they still need to interact with their citizens or risk facing organized 
resistance. A government that prioritizes its own enrichment over the welfare of the 
country will still be coerced into more optimal behavior by the group on whose support 
its survival is highly dependent. The former should especially be true in countries where 
the winning coalition has a wider and highly independent membership and the selectorate 
is diverse.  In societies that are more economically developed, the constraints will be 
even stronger; higher national wealth tends to produce a middle class of businessmen 
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who can act as a monitoring mechanism against governmental predatory behavior. As 
their incomes depend on the health of the economy, they will counter actions that 
threaten those interests. Coupled with the marginal returns from repressive action and the 
trade-off between repression and loyalty, even non-democratic regimes can face 
significant constraints on unilateral use of power.   
In contrast, executive recruitment is empirically insignificant and political competition, 
while significant, is negatively related to HDI. This contradicts the hypothesis previously 
stated. One of the possible reasons is the abuse of political opening and election by 
demagogues and rent-seekers, mentioned in Chapter 4. Still, other explanations will be 
explored. 
Moreover, the durability of a regime has a positive and significant coefficient in 
all of the regression models.  As Clague et. al (1996) assert, economic growth is not 
affected by a lack of democratic rights, but by the durability of a regime. Actually, a 
regime that expects to remain in power for a longer time would have a greater return on 
implementing and protecting property rights than one with a shorter horizon. A favorable 
economic environment is more likely to exist in a stable political regime with a future 
outlook.   
In accordance with the literature, governance indicators have a positive effect on a 
country’s welfare (Sen, 2014; Hallerod et al., 2013). As argued throughout the study, the 
empirical analysis has confirmed that there is a strong and positive correlation between 
HDI and the rule of law. There is a multitude of reasons as to why rule of law is 
important for the development of a society (Agrast et al., 2012).  Most importantly, the 
presence of the rule of law promotes an environment where justice and individual rights 
are respected. Individuals are more confident that their contracts, shelter, and livelihoods 
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will be secure. Significantly, lower income groups will be able to defend their rights and 
gain empowerment through the rule of law. The function of the rule of law in the socio-
economic plane is to generate persistent and noticeable improvements in the welfare of 
the society (Shivute, 2009). Similar empirical findings of the relationship between human 
development and rule of law are present in the literature (Pinzon-Rondon et al., 2015; 
Uslaner, 2008; Trebilcock et al., 2009).  Thus, countries seeking to develop need to 
ensure that they are able to offer adequate rule of law.   
Equally important for developmental efforts is political stability and absence of 
violence. In this study, the variable has been positive and significant in both HDI and 
GDP per capita models. As theorized, countries that are riddled with armed conflict, 
violent rebellions, terrorism, or ethnic tensions can hardly achieve a semblance of 
stability to fulfill their basic functions. Sudden changes in the authority patterns tend to 
cause instability. Transitions to democratic governance are often a messy process, and 
can be very difficult in countries where political stability is already lacking. Rather than 
facilitating cohesion within society, the initial phases of democratization can lead to 
execration of existing cleavages or creation of new ones (Ottaway, 2013). Consequently, 
the priority should be given to achieving political stability as its absence can hinder other 
efforts. Most importantly, political instability worsens human welfare within a country 
which might feed into a self-reinforcing cycle (Fosu, 2010; Kim et al., 2010).  
 In order to devise targeted policies that benefit those most in need of assistance, 
governments have to be capable of discerning the interests and needs of the population. 
As shown in the results, voice and accountability improve the welfare of a country. In 
countries where there is no transfer of information between the government and the 
people, policy making becomes a difficult task. A government cannot improve welfare 
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policies if there is no feedback mechanism. While civil liberties might be restrained, 
alternative mechanisms need to facilitate information sharing.  As argued before, 
institutions like the legislature can provide a mechanism for the diffusion of information 
between the people and the ruling group (Gandhi, 2008). Also, courts can provide a 
means of maintaining accountability among the ruling ranks.  While they can be utilized 
to pursue interests of the ruler, they can also become “important sites of political 
resistance” (Ginsburg et al., p.2). However, countries with closed political regimes that 
perform poorly in terms of accountability and lack any transparency can hamper their 
economic development and societal welfare.  
 Market-based economies have been linked to better economic performance. 
Namely, as mentioned before, economic freedom has been shown to have a positive 
effect with economic development. However, economic freedom also contributes to 
improvements in human welfare. The economic freedom indices generally have the 
expected effect on HDI. In accordance with the theoretical section, property rights are 
positively correlated with human development. The importance of securing private 
property stretches as far back as Ancient Greece (Bitros, 2004). It is a basic component of 
market-based economies. Governments need to provide guarantees that they will not 
intrude upon capital; guarantees they will not default on. Otherwise, monetary policy, 
financial markets and other areas of the economy will suffer from instability. Unjustified 
acts of expropriation of private property, be it through high taxes or outright confiscation, 
decrease investor and consumer confidence, and the economy stagnates. In contrast, 
environments with sound property rights motivate individuals to engage in 
entrepreneurial activities and facilitate technological advancement because they reduce 
the risk associated with those activities. Hence, property safeguards involve “investment, 
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innovation, the possibility of wide scale exchange, and improved governance” (Sullivan 
et al., 2007, p.32). Likewise, business freedom is positively related to human welfare. 
Countries that offer a business-friendly environment tend to strongly stimulate innovation 
and benefit the most from foreign investment. Where the basic conditions for enterprises 
are poor and the mere process of starting a business is mired with inefficiency and 
bureaucratic processes, the economy suffers. Moreover, attempts to utilize 
entrepreneurial activity to improve livelihoods of the lower income households can be 
frustrated. Due to this, countries that ensure their economies cater to different economic 
activities will be better able to improve overall prosperity. Effects of trade have always 
warranted conflicting views, where one economic current encouraged free trade as to 
facilitate exchange of information, labor, resources, capital and innovation, while others 
caution that trade can have negative impacts for countries at low levels of development 
(Oatley, 2015). However, on a general level, trade freedom is an important driver of 
development. By stimulating competition, trade facilitates innovation, quality 
improvement, job mobility, savings, and investments.  Free trade gives individuals the 
capacity to improve their standards of living because it is able to provide many different 
types of goods and services by encourages competition that improves the quality of goods 
while keeping their prices low (Froning, 2000). As a result, countries should pursue 
policies that liberalize their economies and trade with other nations. Monetary freedom 
also has a positive and significant correlation. While inflation can be a normal and neutral 
phenomenon, once it passes a certain threshold (2-3% usually), it can threaten the 
stability of the economy. Inflation erodes the value of the currency and assets, harms 
individuals on fixed incomes (i.e. pensioners), can cause a deterioration in the balance of 
payments, decreases investment due to uncertainty and can cause unemployment 
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(Mankiw, 2012). Hence, higher levels of inflation reduce monetary freedom and have 
harmful impacts on the society. However, government spending and investment 
freedoms, while significant, are negative correlated with human development. This 
contradicts the hypothesis and should be further analyzed in future studies.  
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6 Looking to the future.  
 
This study has investigated the link between regime types, on one hand, and economic 
and human development, on the other hand.  Looking at the theoretical literature, it was 
found that there was a lot of ambiguity in linking specific performance to a single regime 
type. In other words, the performance seemed to be mixed. In this light, the hypothesis 
forwarded was that political regimes might not play an important role in determining 
either the economic performance or in the human development advancements. However, 
it was established that there was a set of factors that might have a much better 
explanatory power. Firstly, it was determined that the rule of law was a highly important 
factor for a country’s development. By ensuring stability, equality and innovation, the 
existence of a robust legal system was robust. This was also affirmed through the case 
studies of China and Brazil. Secondly, constraints on the Executive power were also seen 
as crucial for ensuring efficient economic policy and social welfare provision.  In 
particular, countries that faced a restraint, either through checks and balances provided by 
separation of power between the branches of government, or by groups capable of 
influencing political outcomes and disposing of the ruler. Finally, economic freedoms 
were hypothesized to be important factors contributing to development. Specifically, it 
has been well established that economic freedoms are highly related to economic 
development, and economic development tends to contribute to human development. The 
hypotheses were tested using a dataset composed out of World Bank data, Heritage 
Institution data and Polity IV data. It was found that rule of law, constraints on the 
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executive, and economic freedom were positively correlated with development both in 
terms of HDI and GDPpc.  
There are several recommendations for future studies.  Firstly, a wider set of data 
should be used, especially capturing the years leading up to the end of the Cold War as it 
is an important period for regime change and political restructuring. Secondly, this study 
used a simple linear regression model. Future studies should use more sophisticated 
regression methods to be better able to deal with panel datasets that vary both across time 
and subjects. Namely, fixed and random effects should be explored as they are 
abundantly used within the literature dealing with political economy themes.  
Thirdly, future studies should examine how to encourage and facilitate the 
development of rule of law in developing countries. But the rule of law should not 
necessarily be the western version, but should be integrated with the specific socio-
political context and historical experience. Fourthly, economic freedoms should be 
encouraged while giving special care to the fact that countries at very low levels of 
development will have different experiences that other countries higher up the chain.  
Fifthly, more attention should be given to studying the types and degrees of constraints 
across different political settings. As illustrated, constraints in non-Western and non-
democratic societies might not resemble those of the West. However, this should not 
dismiss their potential. Rather, more attention should be given towards understanding 
how they develop and what conditions make them more robust.  
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ENDNOTES  
                                                
1 A country that has begun transitioning to a democracy but had not completed 
democratic consolidation. 
2 During transition to democracy, countries were found to be more aggressive and war 
prone. 
3 The difference among Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, or the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan is much more stark than the one between USA and UK, for example. 
4 To be explained in the following paragraphs 
5 They are chosen by the people directly or indirectly, depending on the system 
(parliamentary, presidential or mixed), and are re-elected or voted out of the government 
based on how well they have performed. In some countries or municipalities, state 
officials can be recalled. See Janda, K., Berry, J. M., Goldman, J., & Schildkraut, D. 
(205). The challenge of democracy: American Government in global politics: Cengage 
Learning. 
6 There is universal suffrage that does not curtail rights of minorities or disabled; 
individuals are able to register to vote and run for office, individuals have access to 
information on candidates and their policies, decisions of elections are done in a 
transparent manner and are accepted by the losers. 
7 All adult citizens have the right to cast their vote in the election of officials. 
8 For more see Schmitter, P. C., & Karl, T. L. (1991). What democracy is... and is not. 
Journal of democracy, 2(3), 75-88. 
9 Whenever majority decides, the results will not be able to cater to every individual’s 
preference.   
10 Generally, refers to the state and its administration. In the case of presidential systems, 
it would be composed out of the three branches (executive, legislative and judiciary). In 
case of parliamentary democracies, it would refer to the Prime Minister and their cabinet.  
11 Unless he faced impeachment due to crimes of treason, bribery or other high crimes. 
12 As generally acknowledged, political stability is sine qua non for economic 
development and general welfare of the society.  
13 Power is widely and evenly distributed throughout the society; non-governmental 
groups can use resources to affect political outcomes; diverse views compete in a 
peaceful manner.  
14 Affected by weather changes like draught, floods and so forth.  
15 Demographics, topography.  
16 The need to raise revenue gave rise to strong protections of property rights of those 
lending the resources, leading to a liberal economy. See Ginsburg, T., & Moustafa, T. 
(2008). Rule by law: the politics of courts in authoritarian regimes. 
17 The concept of representative democracy was borrowed from Rome. 
18 This will be presented later, with the idea of the hybrid regimes. 
19 Individuals who are able to affect political outcomes. According to Tsebelis (2002), 
they are individuals who can prevent a change in the status quo p.2.  
20 Persson and Tabellini (2005, p.276) note that presidentialism could lead to overall 
better policies in consolidated and solid democracies but not in more precarious 
democratic situations. 
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21 Even if elected by no more than a plurality. 
22 Social democracies tend to score the highest on all well-being indices, from inequality 
to happiness with life.  
23 Where instability means that the mentioned characteristics of democracies can weaken 
the state in a manner that makes them less capable to govern effectively. 
24 The idea of tyranny of majority; the ignorant majority would lead to outcomes that 
would hurt the more knowledgeable. See Bushouse, B., & Wiarda, H. J. (2005). 
Comparative Politics: Comparative Public Policy: Routledge. 
25 If a country is given a value of 1 for unregulated executive recruitment or is in the 
intermediate category, competitiveness is 0. 
26 If power transfers are unregulated, or if there is a transition to or from unregulated 
executive recruitment. 
27 Which is expected as strict birth succession is not the status quo anymore.  
28 As it has been clarified that they mostly overlap. 
29 The variance inflation factor fell below 6. Only in cases of control dummy variables did 
it go above that value, but this can be tolerated. 
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Table 1. Linear Regression Results: HDI, Regime type, and Polity IV elements 
 Model 1  Model 2  
Democracy  2.102 (1.509)   
Hybrid -0.789 (1.311)   
Political Competition     -3.92* (1.66) 
Executive Recruitment      -0.112 (1.815) 
Strong Constraints     6.76*** (1.32) 
Durable  0.0313* (0.0148)   
Rule of Law  6.954*** (0.723)   
Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence    4.38*** (0.608) 
Foreign Direct Investment   0.005355 (0.0377) 0.0262 (0.0430) 
Financial Freedom  0.0119 (0.0245) 0.102*** (0.0258) 
Ethnic Fractionalization  -0.0138 (0.0182) -0.0400 (0.0214) 
Language Fractionalization   0.0000645***   (0.0000192) 0.0000761*** (0.0000227) 
Religious Fractionalization   0.0748*** (0.0180) 0.0883*** (0.0184) 
French Colony  0.249 (1.756) 0.954 (1.757) 
Spanish Colony -0.812 (0.973) -0.763 (1.050) 
British Colony -1.018 (1.269) -0.388 (1.434) 
Middle East and North 
Africa  1.835 (2.677) -4.44 (2.512) 
Sub Saharan Africa -20.30*** (1.976) -30.60*** (1.578) 
Europe and Central Asia  3.676* (1.855) -2.67 (1.695) 
East Asia and the Pacific  -3.112 (1.590) -10.88*** (1.821) 
South Asia -10.65*** (2.490) -16.94*** (2.763) 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean    2.071 (1.618) -9.199*** (1.358) 
Constant   65.98*** (2.651) 71.43*** (2.741) 
R-sq   0.831  0.799  
N   469  469  
Standard errors in 
parenthesis  
    
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001 
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Table 2. Linear Regression Results: HDI and Economic Freedom 
 
 
 
 
  
 Model 1  
Investment Freedom -0.0998* (0.0305) 
Property Rights 0.116* (0.0354) 
Business Freedom 0.1813*** (0.0423) 
Monetary Freedom 0.064* (0.0243) 
Government Spending   -0.056* (0.0238) 
Trade Freedom 0.187*** (0.0368) 
Fiscal Freedom 0.0326 (0.0398) 
Financial Freedom 0.0317 (0.0306) 
Foreign Direct Investment  0.036 (0.0480) 
Ethnic Fractionalization  -0.069** (0.0203) 
Language Fractionalization  0.000133*** (0.00003) 
Religious Fractionalization  0.0975*** (0.0193) 
French Colony 0.572 (1.980) 
Spanish Colony -0.957 (1.041) 
British Colony -0.9378 (1.492) 
Other Colony -0.314 (1.134) 
Middle East and North Africa -2.329 (2.16) 
Sub Saharan Africa -25.19*** (1.74) 
Europe and Central Asia -0.127 (1.65) 
East Asia and the Pacific  -7.985*** (1.742) 
South Asia -13.60*** (2.293) 
Latin America and the Caribbean  -3.941** (1.493) 
Constant 44.73*** (4.727) 
R-sq 0.812  
N 470  
Standard errors in parenthesis    
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001   
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Table 3. Linear Regression Results: Log GDP per capita and dependent variables 
 Model 1  Model 2  
Democracy   -0.0150 (0.190) 
Hybrid   -0.228 (0.160) 
Political Competition   -0.378* (0.171)   
Executive Recruitment    -0.0960 (0.195)   
Strong Constraints    0.356* (0.111)   
Gross Capital Formation(log)   0.134 (0.0933) 0.126 (0.0945) 
Labor force (% of population, log)   0.991* (0.326) 1.189*** (0.329) 
Durability   0.0097*** (0.00147) 0.00978*** (0.00148) 
Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence    0.117 (0.0774) 0.0729 (0.0806) 
Voice and Accountability   0.43* (0.124) 0.413** (0.131) 
Government Spending  -0.0047* (0.00216) -0.00558** (0.00212) 
Property Rights  -0.0018 (0.00256) -0.00228 (0.00259) 
Business Freedom   0.0173*** (0.00369) 0.0190*** (0.00378) 
Ethnic Fractionalization   -0.000352 (0.00202) 0.00000009 (0.00196) 
Language Fractionalization    
0.00000505*    (0.00000222) 
0.00000512* (0.0000022) 
Religious Fractionalization    0.0015 (0.00190) 0.00116 (0.00196) 
French Colony   0.2 (0.165) 0.228 (0.167) 
Spanish Colony   0.0612 (0.119) 0.0744 (0.122) 
British Colony  -0.0236 (0.137) 0.0195 (0.132) 
Middle East and North Africa    0.655* (0.295) 0.848** (0.313) 
Sub Saharan Africa   -0.757** (0.220) -0.715** (0.225) 
Europe and Central Asia    0.751*** (0.207) 0.813*** (0.204) 
East Asia and the Pacific     0.018 (0.192) 0.117 (0.187) 
South Asia   -0.762** (0.265) -0.650* (0.269) 
Latin America and the Caribbean     0.396 (0.205) 0.427* (0.206) 
Constant    7.464*** (1.350) 7.462*** (1.365) 
R-sq    0.803  0.798  
N    477  477  
Standard errors in parenthesis      
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001     
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Storage type Format Description 
country str52 %52s Country Name 
year int %8.0g Year 
democ float %8.0g Institutionalized Democracy Index 
autoc float %8.0g Institutionalized Autocracy Index 
polity float %8.0g Combined Polity Index 
polity2 float %8.0g Revised Combined Polity Index 
durable float %8.0g Regime Durability 
xrreg float %8.0g Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment 
xrcomp float %8.0g Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment 
xropen byte %8.0g Openness of Executive Recruitment 
xconst float %8.0g Executive Constraints (Decision Rules) 
parreg float %8.0g Regulation of Participation 
parcomp float %8.0g The Competitiveness of Participation 
exrec float %8.0g Executive Recruitment 
exconst float %8.0g Executive Constraints (=XCONST) 
polcomp float %8.0g Political Competition (reg+comp) 
coc float %8.0g Control of Corruption 
vnda float %8.0g Voice and Accountability 
rq float %8.0g Regulatory Quality 
rol float %8.0g Rule of Law 
psav float %8.0g Political Stability and Absence of Violence 
gtef float %8.0g Government Effectiveness 
hdi float %8.0g HDI score 
colrulerr str14 %14s Primary colonial ruler 
pop double %8.0g Population 
gdp double %8.0g Gross Domestic Product 
region str26 %26s Region 
tradefr float %8.0g Trade Freedom 
busfr float %8.0g Business Freedom 
proprig byte %8.0g Property Rights 
frind float %8.0g Freedom Index Overall 
monetfr float %8.0g Monetary Freedom 
invstfr byte %8.0g Investment Freedom 
govtsp float %8.0g Government Spending 
ffcorupt float %8.0g Freedom From Corruption 
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Table A1 continued 
Variable Storage type Format Description 
fisfr float %8.0g Fiscal Freedom 
finfr byte %8.0g Financial Freedom 
internet float %8.0g Internet users per 100 
lf long %8.0g Labor force 
tinv float %8.0g Capital gross formation (% of GDP) 
natsav float %8.0g National Savings (% GDP) 
fdi float %8.0g Foreign Direct Investment 
gdpgr float %8.0g GDP growth rate 
colother float %9.0g Colonized by other 
Spaincol float %9.0g Spanish Colony 
Franccol float %9.0g French Colony 
Britcol float %9.0g British Colony 
nocol float %9.0g Not colonized 
MENA float %9.0g Middle East & North Africa 
SSA float %9.0g Sub-Saharan Africa 
EUCA float %9.0g Europe & Central Asia 
EAP float %9.0g East Asia & the Pacific 
SA float %9.0g Southeast Asia 
LAC float %9.0g Latina America & the Caribbean 
NA float %9.0g North America 
gdppc float %9.0g GDP per capita 
loggdp float %9.0g Log of GDP per capita 
logtinv float %9.0g Log capital gross formation (% of GDP) 
lfpp float %9.0g Labor force as % of population 
loglfpp float %9.0g Log labor force (% of pop) 
exrecr float %9.0g Executive Recruitment, competitive 
nexrecr float %9.0g Executive Recruitment, not competitive 
polcom float %9.0g Political competition, competitive 
npolcom float %9.0g Political competition, not competitive 
strongcon float %9.0g Executive Constraints(Decision Rules) 
exist 
nocon float %9.0g Executive Constraints do not exist 
democracy float %9.0g polity2>7 
autocracy float %9.0g polity2<0 
hybrid float %9.0g polity2=>0 & polity2<=7 
hdi100 float %9.0g HDI x 100 
al_ethnic float %9.0g Prob. 2 random people share ethnicity 
al_language float %9.0g Prob. 2 random people share language 
al_religion float %9.0g Prob. random people share religion 
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Table 2A. Summary Statistics 
Variable     N Mean SD Min Max 
Year 480 2005.00 7.08 1995.00 2015.00 
Institutionalized Democracy Index 480 6.46 3.52 0.00 10.00 
Institutionalized Autocracy Index 480 1.13 2.02 0.00 9.00 
Combined Polity Index 480 5.33 5.35 -9.00 10.00 
Revised Combined Polity Index 480 5.33 5.35 -9.00 10.00 
Regime Durability 480 28.97 34.53 0.00 206.00 
Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment 480 2.62 0.53 1.00 3.00 
Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment 480 2.30 1.01 0.00 3.00 
Openness of Executive Recruitment 480 3.58 1.18 0.00 4.00 
Executive Constraints (Decision Rules) 480 5.43 1.77 1.00 7.00 
Regulation of Participation 480 3.24 1.26 1.00 5.00 
The Competitiveness of Participation 480 3.71 1.14 0.00 5.00 
Executive Recruitment 480 6.85 1.85 2.00 8.00 
Executive Constraints (=XCONST) 480 5.44 1.77 1.00 7.00 
Political Competition (reg+comp) 480 7.71 2.48 1.00 10.00 
Control of Corruption 480 -0.00 1.02 -1.55 2.59 
Voice and Accountability 480 0.08 0.91 -1.83 1.77 
Regulatory Quality 480 0.10 0.90 -2.21 2.08 
Rule of Law 480 -0.02 0.98 -2.02 2.12 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence 480 -0.15 0.90 -2.76 1.67 
Government Effectiveness 480 0.07 0.96 -1.84 2.25 
HDI rank 480 93.78 56.54 1.00 188.00 
HDI score 474 0.65 0.17 0.23 0.94 
Population 480  5.63E+07 1.78E+08 726695 1.37E+09 
Gross Domestic Product 478  4.29E+11 1.57E+12 2.54E+08 1.79E+13 
Trade Freedom 479 68.23 15.80 0.00 90.00 
Business Freedom 479 64.89 13.92 20.00 100.00 
Property Rights 479 48.80 23.18 0.00 95.00 
Freedom Index Overall 479 59.69 9.96 21.40 82.60 
Monetary Freedom 479 72.18 15.31 0.00 94.20 
Investment Freedom 479 55.43 19.94 0.00 95.00 
Government Spending 479 64.97 24.51 0.00 97.60 
Freedom From Corruption 479 41.23 22.36 6.70 100.00 
Fiscal Freedom 479 70.13 13.78 30.50 99.70 
Financial Freedom 479 51.52 18.99 10.00 90.00 
Internet users per 100 475 21.74 26.96 0.00 96.81 
Labor force 480  2.62e+07  8.99e+07  2.81e+05 8.06e+08 
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Table 2A. continued 
     
Variable     N Mean SD Min Max 
Capital gross formation (% of GDP) 479 23.03 7.53 1.50 67.54 
National Savings 477 20.80 9.52 -13.09 52.66 
Foreign Direct Investment 476 3.79 6.41 -16.07 71.72 
GDP growth 477 4.23 3.77 -20.60 35.22 
Colonized by other 480 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 
Spanish Colony 480 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00 
French Colony 480 0.15 0.35 0.00 1.00 
British Colony 480 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Not colonized 480 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 
Middle East & North Africa 480 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00 
Sub-Saharan Africa 480 0.29 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Europe & Central Asia 480 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 
East Asia & the Pacific 480 0.10 0.31 0.00 1.00 
Southeast Asia 480 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 
Latina America & the Caribbean 480 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 
North America 480 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 
GDP per capita 478  10029.93  15219.83 124.05 87646.27 
Log of GDP per capita 478 8.06 1.62 4.82 11.38 
Capital gross formation (% of GDP) (log) 479 3.08 0.36 0.41 4.21 
Labor force as % of population 480 0.44 0.07 0.25 0.59 
Labor force as % of population (log) 480 -0.85 0.17 -1.38 -0.53 
Executive Recruitment, competitive 480 0.78 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Executive Recruitment, not competitive 480 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Political competition, competitive 480 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Political competition, not competitive 480 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Executive Constraints(Decision Rules) exist 480 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Executive Constraints do not exist 480 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Democracy 480 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Autocracy 480 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Hybrid 480 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00 
HDI score 474 65.19 17.33 23.20 94.40 
Ethnic Fractionalization 480 45.25 25.52 1.19 93.02 
Language Fractionalization 480  -1579.75  11114.90 -77700 92.27 
Religion Fractionalization 480 41.77 24.75 0.35 86.03 
      
      
      
  
 
 
128 
 
Table 3A. Summary Statistics for Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment  
 
 
Regulation of Chief 
Executive 
Recruitment 
Frequency  Percent Cum. 
1 10        2.08 2.08 
2 163 33.96 36.04 
3 307 63.96 100 
 
 
Table 4A. Summary Statistics for Competitiveness of Chief Executive Recruitment  
 
 
Competitiveness of 
Chief Executive 
Recruitment 
Frequency  Percent Cum. 
0 44 9.17 9.17 
1 63 13.12 22.29 
2 80 16.67 38.96 
3 293 61.04 100.00 
 
 
 
Table 5A. Summary Statistics for Openness of Chief Executive Recruitment 
 
 
Openness of Chief 
Executive 
Recruitment 
Frequency  Percent Cum. 
0 44 9.17 9.17 
1 / / / 
2 11 2.29 11.46 
3 3 0.62 12.08 
4 422 87.92 100.00 
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Table 6A. Summary Statistics for Executive Recruitment (concept variable) 
 
 
Executive 
Recruitment 
Frequency  Percent Cum. 
0 / / / 
1 / / / 
2 11 2.29 2.29 
3 52 10.83 13.12 
4 13 2.71 15.83 
5 31 6.46 22.29 
6 3 0.62 22.92 
7 77 16.04 38.96 
8 293 61.04 100.00 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7A. Summary Statistics for Executive Constraints (concept variable) 
 
Executive 
Constraints 
Frequency  Percent Cum. 
0 / / / 
1 7 1.46 1.46 
2 31 6.46 7.92 
3 69 14.38 22.29 
4 21 4.38 26.67 
5 70 14.58 41.25 
6 76 15.83 57.08 
7 206 42.92 100 
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Table 8A. Summary Statistics for Regulation of Participation  
 
 
Regulation of 
Participation 
Frequency  Percent Cum. 
1 4 0.83 0.83 
2 188 39.17 40.00 
3 116 24.17 64.17 
4 35 7.29 71.46 
5 137 28.54 100.00 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8Ab. Summary Statistics for Competitiveness of Participation  
 
 
Competiveness of 
Participation 
Frequency  Percent Cum. 
0 8 1.67 1.67 
1 13 2.71 4.38 
2 40 8.33 12.71 
3 127 26.46 39.17 
4 155 32.29 71.46 
5 137 28.54 100.00 
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Table 9A. Summary Statistics for Political Competitiveness (concept variable) 
 
Political 
Competition 
Frequency  Percent Cum. 
1 13 2.71 2.71 
2 22 4.58 7.29 
3 18 3.75 11.04 
4 4 0.83 11.88 
5 4 0.83 12.71 
6 66 13.75 26.46 
7 61 12.71 39.17 
8 32 6.67 45.83 
9 123 25.62 71.46 
10 137 28.54 100.00 
 
 
Table 10A. Translation of Polity IV Executive Recruitment Concepts and 
Component Variables  
 
 
Source: Polity IV Project: Data User’s Manual v2015 
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Table 11A. Constraints on the Executive Scheme 
Constraints on Executive  Value Description 
Unlimited Authority 1 i. Constitutional restrictions on executive action are 
ignored. 
ii. Constitution is frequently revised or suspended at the 
executive's initiative. 
iii. There is no legislative assembly, or there is one but 
it is called and dismissed at the executive's pleasure. 
iv. The executive appoints a majority of members of 
any accountability group and can remove them at will. 
v. The legislature cannot initiate legislation or veto or 
suspend acts of the executive. vi. Rule by decree is 
repeatedly used.  
Intermediate Category 2 n/a 
Slight to Moderate Limitation 
on Executive Authority 
3 i. The legislature initiates some categories of 
legislation. 
ii. The legislature blocks implementation of executive 
acts and decrees. 
iii. Attempts by the executive to change some 
constitutional restrictions, such as prohibitions on 
succeeding himself, or extending his term, fail and are 
not adopted. iv. The ruling party initiates some 
legislation or takes some administrative action 
independently of the executive. 
v. The legislature or party approves some categories of 
appointments nominated by the executive. 
vi. There is an independent judiciary.  
vii. Situations in which there exists a civilian executive, 
but in which policy decisions, for all practical purposes, 
reflect the demands of the military.  
Intermediate Category 4 n/a 
Substantial Limitations on 
Executive Authority 
5 i. A legislature or party council often modifies or 
defeats executive proposals for action. 
ii. A council or legislature sometimes refuses funds to 
the executive. 
iii. The accountability group makes important 
appointments to administrative posts. iv. The legislature 
refuses the executive permission to leave the country.  
Intermediate Category 6 n/a 
Executive Parity or 
Subordination 
7 i. A legislature, ruling party, or council of nobles 
initiates much or most important legislation. 
ii. The executive (president, premier, king, cabinet, 
council) is chosen by the accountability group and is 
dependent on its continued support to remain in office 
(as in most parliamentary systems).  
iii. In multi-party democracies, there is chronic "cabinet 
instability."  
 
Source: Polity IV Project: Data User’s Manual v2015 
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Table 12A. Regulation of Participation Scheme 
 
 
Regulation of Participation  Value Description 
Unregulated 1 Unregulated: Political participation is fluid; there are no 
enduring national political organizations and no 
systematic regime controls on political activity. 
Political groupings tend to form around particular 
leaders, regional interests, religious or ethnic or clan 
groups, etc.; but the number and relative importance of 
such groups in national political life varies substantially 
over time.  
Multiple Identity  2 Multiple Identity: There are relatively stable and 
enduring political groups which compete for political 
influence at the national level–parties, regional groups, 
or ethnic groups, not necessarily elected–but there are 
few, recognized overlapping (common) interests.  
Sectarian  3 Sectarian: Political demands are characterized by 
incompatible interests and intransigent posturing among 
multiple identity groups and oscillate more or less 
regularly between intense factionalism and government 
favoritism, that is, when one identity group secures 
central power it favors group members in central 
allocations and restricts competing groups' political 
activities, until it is displaced in turn (i.e., active 
factionalism). Also coded here are polities in which 
political groups are based on restricted membership and 
significant portions of the population historically have 
been excluded from access to positions of power (latent 
factionalism, e.g., indigenous peoples in some South 
American countries).  
Restricted 4 Restricted: Some organized political participation is 
permitted without intense factionalism but significant 
groups, issues, and/or types of conventional 
participation are regularly excluded from the political 
process  
Regulated 5 Relatively stable and enduring political groups regularly 
compete for political influence and positions with little 
use of coercion. No significant groups, issues, or types 
of conventional political action are regularly excluded 
from the political process. 
 
Source: Polity IV Project: Data User’s Manual v2015 
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Table 13A. Political Competition Concept Variable Scheme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Polity IV Project: Data User’s Manual v2015 
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Table 14A. Institutionalized Democracy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Polity IV Project: Data User’s Manual v205 
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Table 15A. Institutionalized Autocracy 
 
 
 
Source: Polity IV Project: Data User’s Manual v205 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
